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3Th e Committee for Economic Development (CED) believes that the U.S. employer-based health-
insurance system is failing – and the recently enacted health reform, the Patient Protection 
and Aff ordable Care Act (PPACA), will not reverse that dynamic.  Fewer American workers 
have insurance now than did ten years ago; and fewer American fi rms are off ering health 
insurance now than did then.  Many people do without care because they are not covered, 
or fear – with justifi cation – that one illness or the loss of a job will cost them their coverage.  
Th e competitiveness of American fi rms is threatened by the cost of health insurance.  Public 
budgets at every level of government are eroded by the costs of health care, including costs that 
previously were paid by employers.  Th ough the United States is the wealthiest nation in the 
world and arguably has the best care for persons with dire health needs who do have coverage, 
our overall health status is mediocre at best.  Although the new law will create pathways to 
private coverage for some people who are not insured by their employers, and many others will 
be made eligible for Medicaid, the clear intent is to maintain employer coverage for as many as 
possible – and there is precious little in the law to improve this core structure of the U.S. health-
care system.  Th erefore, we believe that our health-insurance system will remain in crisis, 
and needs immediate attention – well beyond the recently enacted reform law – to stop steady 
erosion that may become sharp, quantum deterioration.  We have proposed a fundamental 
restructuring of the health-care system to address this crisis.  With the nation having focused 
on this issue, and with funding from the Blue Shield of California Foundation, we have worked 
to learn what the health-care system of California can teach us about national reform, and how 
national reform might aff ect California.
Introduction
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Performance Standards for a Nation’s Health-
Care System
Th e standards by which to judge the overall performance 
of a health-care system are cost, quality, and access.
“Cost” is the usual shorthand term for the amount a 
society spends on health care.  Do health insurance and 
health care remain within reach for families of moderate 
means?  Can health-insurance premiums fi t within the 
total compensation that is aff ordable by the employers of 
most or all people?
“Quality” has many meanings.  Are Americans likely 
to receive recommended care – that is, those interven-
tions that are well supported by clinical evidence and are 
known to benefi t patients?  How likely are patients with 
serious chronic conditions to get the care they need?  
How likely are they to get appropriate care – that is, care 
of the kind and in just the amount that confers maximum 
benefi t, but no more?
“Access” is shorthand for people’s ability to obtain appro-
priate care, including having health insurance that makes 
care reasonably aff ordable to people who need it, and 
whose provisions, like coinsurance and deductibles, do 
not deter people from obtaining care that is important for 
their health.  It also means having geographic and trans-
portation access to a facility and to professionals who will 
provide appropriate care.
For all of our country’s wealth and power, our healthcare 
system demonstrably fails to meet these basic criteria 
– and the recent reform shows little promise of improve-
ment.
On cost, the price of an average family insurance policy – 
$11,500 per year for a family of four in 20061 – is almost 20 
1 National Coalition on Health Care, “Health Insurance 
Cost: Facts on the Cost of Health Care,” http://www.nchc.
org/facts/cost.shtml (accessed June 12, 2007).
percent of the earning power of the median household,2 
and health expenditures are growing about 2.7 percent-
age points per year faster than the non-healthcare gross 
domestic product (GDP).3  Th us, health insurance is pric-
ing itself out of reach.
On quality, authoritative studies document numerous 
errors of prescription and treatment, and inappropri-
ate and unnecessary surgery and hospitalization, which 
cause unnecessary suff ering, illness, injury and cost.4  
Th ere are wide variations in medical practices from one 
community to another, and even among doctors in the 
same community.5  Moreover, a 2003 study by RAND 
found that consumers are receiving only about 55 per-
cent of the care called for under generally accepted stan-
dards of medical practice.6
2 U.S. Bureau of the Census, Historical Income Tables, 
“Table F-6.  Regions--Families (All Races) by Median and 
Mean Income: 1953 to 2008,” http://www.census.gov/
hhes/www/income/histinc/f06AR.xls (accessed May 26, 
2010).  In 2006, median income for families (that is, two 
or more persons related by blood, marriage or adoption 
living together – not including one-person households or 
unrelated groups) was $58,407.  
3 National Coalition on Health Care, “Health Insurance 
Cost: Facts on the Cost of Health Care,” http://www.nchc.
org/facts/cost.shtml (accessed June 12, 2007).
4 Linda T. Kohn, Janet M. Corrigan, and Molla S. Donald-
son, eds., To Err is Human: Building a Safer Health System 
(Washington, DC: National Academy Press, 2000). See 
also: Philip Aspden, and the Committee on Identifying 
and Preventing Medication Errors, Board on Health Care 
Services, eds., Preventing Medication Errors (Washington 
DC: National Academy Press, 2006).
5 John Wennberg, M.D., Professor of Medicine at Dartmouth 
Medical School and director of Dartmouth’s Center for 
the Clinical Evaluative Sciences, documented variations 
of ten-fold and more.  See: J. Wennberg and A. Gittelsohn, 
“Variations in Medical Care Among Small Areas,” Scientifi c 
American 246, no. 4 (1982): pp. 120-134; John E. Wennberg 
et al., “Changes in Tonsillectomy Rates Associated with 
Feedback and Review,” Pediatrics 59, no. 6, (1977): pp. 821-
826.  
6 Elizabeth A. McGlynn et al., “Th e Quality of Health Care 
Delivered to Adults in the United States,” Th e New England 
Journal of Medicine 384, no. 26 (2003): pp. 2635-2645.
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6But perhaps most seriously, on access, 46.3 million 
Americans were without health insurance in 2008, up 
from 38.7 million in 2000.7
Employer-Based Health Insurance Is Declining
Most insured Americans get their coverage through 
employment, either theirs or a family member’s.  But the 
number and percentage of Americans covered by em-
ployer-based health insurance (EBI) is declining.  From 
2000 to 2008, the absolute number of people under age 
65 covered by EBI fell from 167.9 million to 163.1 million; 
and the covered percentage of the population under age 
65 fell from 68.3 percent to 61.9 percent.8  From 2000 to 
2007, the percentage of fi rms off ering health benefi ts fell 
from 69 percent to 60 percent, refl ecting mainly small 
employers dropping EBI.9  Th ere are underlying forces, 
especially the rapidly increasing cost of health insurance 
and small employers locked out by pre-existing condi-
tions, that make this trend likely to continue.10
Why Is Th is Happening?  Th e entire health-care fi nanc-
ing system rests on infl ationary foundations.  Th e incen-
tives and the organization of health care work against 
aff ordable care.
7 U.S. Bureau of the Census, “Income, Poverty, and Health 
Insurance Coverage in the United States: 2008,” Septem-
ber 2009; U.S. Bureau of the Census, “More People Have 
Health Insurance, Census Bureau Reports,” press release, 
September 28, 2001.
8 U.S. Bureau of the Census, Table HIA-2. Health Insurance 
Coverage Status and Type of Coverage All Persons by Age 
and Sex: 1999 to 2008, http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/
hlthins/data/historical/fi les/hihistt2.xls (accessed May 25, 
2010).
9 Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation and the Health Re-
search and Educational Trust, Employer Health Benefi ts 
2007 Annual Survey (Menlo Park, CA: Henry J. Kaiser Fam-
ily Foundation; Chicago: Health Research and Educational 
Trust, 2007).
10 Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation and the Health Re-
search and Educational Trust, Employer Health Benefi ts, 
2006 Summary of Findings (Menlo Park, CA: Henry J. 
Kaiser Family Foundation; Chicago: Health Research and 
Educational Trust, 2005), p. 1.   Premiums in 2006 are esti-
mated to be higher than those of 2000 by 87 percent.   
Th e causes are several.  However, the heart of the prob-
lem is that the vast majority of employers off er their em-
ployees no choice; they off er either no insurance at all, or 
one insurance company.11  For fi rms that off er coverage, 
having just one carrier is administratively simpler.  Insur-
ers also prefer to cover all of a fi rm’s employees, because 
that minimizes per-worker administrative cost, and obvi-
ates the risk of enrolling only the sickest employees.  Be-
cause employees, understandably, want to choose their 
own doctors, employers tend to off er one insurance plan 
that off ers access to as many doctors as possible; and the 
only way to reimburse doctors under such wide access is 
fee-for-service payment.
Th erefore, the vast majority of employees have no oppor-
tunity or incentive to choose a cost-eff ective high-quality 
health plan, and health-care insurers and providers have 
no inducement to provide the quality, aff ordable care 
that consumers want.  Employers, not patients and con-
sumers, make the decisions that shape the U.S. health-
care system, from fi nancing to delivery of care.  And 
multiplied over tens of thousands of employers, those 
decisions dictate a dominant system of fee-for service 
medicine for the entire population.
Fee-for-service medicine presents the worst incentives: 
the more services, the more fees.  Patients want all the 
services that might deliver any benefi t, however small; 
doctors and hospitals are predisposed to provide those 
services, at least in part because they are paid for each 
service they provide.  Providers actually make more 
money when they are slow to diagnose and treat a prob-
lem:  Th ey are paid for more “services” that way.  Th ere 
is little or no incentive to utilize cost-saving technologi-
cal advances such as health information technology 
and electronic patient records.12  Indeed, in this “cost-
unconscious” environment, there is little incentive to 
fi nd a less-costly way to solve any health problem.  On 
the contrary, costly new discoveries, though often highly 
11 M. Susan Marquis and Stephen H. Long, “Trends in Man-
aged Care and Managed Competition, 1993-97,” Health 
Aff airs 18, no. 6 (1999): pp. 75-88.
12 J.D. Kleinke, “Dot-Gov: Market Failure and the Creation of 
a National Health Information Technology System,” Health 
Aff airs 24, no. 5 (2005): pp. 1246-1262.
7benefi cial, can be deployed at great expense and consid-
erable risk even before they are fully evaluated.
Alternative health plans might off er lower cost by choos-
ing providers who wish to practice in integrated net-
works, taking advantage of technology and other effi  cien-
cies.13  However, such integrated systems would, in eff ect, 
dictate the choice of providers to employees.  Employees 
would not want such an absence of choice, especially if 
they had no sense that they would share in the fi nancial 
savings.
Compounding these structural problems, there has been 
a large increase in the prevalence of chronic disease and 
our ability to treat it – and the cost of doing so.  Twenty 
medical conditions accounted for 67 percent of the per 
capita growth in private health-insurance costs between 
1987 and 2002.14  Th e health-care system is not oriented 
to early detection and treatment or to chronic disease 
management, but rather to a visit to the doctor and the 
collection of a fee for a service to treat symptoms when 
they arise.
Expenditures are increased by the extensive deployment 
of new medical technologies that benefi t people’s lives, 
in some cases greatly, in other cases not at all.  People 
want them, and their doctors want to provide them, and 
society does not want to deny them.  Consumption of 
these technologies has been increasing, often at double 
digit rates.15  Examples include joint replacements and 
invasive cardiology procedures.  Th ere are costly new 
biologics that correct inherited enzyme defi ciencies.  
Cerezyme, a biologic to treat Gaucher’s disease, now 
costs some $200,000 to $600,000 per patient per year de-
13 Joseph P. Newhouse and the Insurance Experiment Group, 
Free for All? – Lessons from the RAND Health Insurance 
Experiment (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 
1993).
14 Kenneth E. Th orpe et al., “Th e Rising Prevalence of Treated 
Disease: Eff ects on Private Health Insurance Spending,” 
Health Aff airs, Web Exclusive, June 27, 2005.
15 Measured on an age-specifi c per-capita basis.  Victor R. 
Fuchs, “Health Care for the Elderly: How Much? Who Will 
Pay for It?” Health Aff airs 18, no. 1 (1999): pp. 11-21.
pending on weight-related dosage.16  New drugs for some 
blood-clotting disorders can exceed $1 million per year, 
and some cancer drugs are also very costly.
Other countries with much lower health costs as shares 
of GDP perform explicit evaluations of costs vs. benefi ts 
for costly new technologies, and do not include tech-
nologies in their insurance coverage whose benefi ts are 
not, in the judgment of offi  cials, worth their extra costs.  
Some politicians call this “rationing,” while other people 
see this as sensible pursuit of value for money and prior-
ity setting.  Th e issue is what technologies patients can 
reasonably expect taxpayers and other premium payers 
to support.
Also, largely because of the fee-for-service method of 
payment to doctors in which millions of individual acts 
must be billed and paid for, improper billing because 
of fraud, carelessness, or error is a huge problem.  Th e 
Offi  ce of the Inspector General of the Department of 
Health and Human Services estimated that in 1996, the 
Medicare Program made about $23.2 billion in improper 
payments.17  As the Inspector General’s Report said, “Th e 
Medicare program is inherently vulnerable to incorrect 
provider billing practices.”18  Th e same could be said of all 
insurance under fee-for-service medicine.
EBI Costs Cause Employers Major Problems.  Employ-
ers, the primary purchasers of health insurance, must 
deal with the insurance market as it exists; they cannot 
themselves change the structure of the entire system.  
EBI costs give employers a powerful incentive to try to 
avoid this growing burden – which employers do, in part, 
by tightening restrictions on who is eligible for EBI, and 
by increasing required employee contributions so that 
16 Greg Anand, “How Drugs for Rare Diseases Became 
Lifeline for Companies,” Wall Street Journal, November 15, 
2005, p. A1.
17 U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Report on 
the Financial Statement Audit of the Health Care Financing 
Administration for Fiscal Year 1996, by June Gibbs Brown, 
Inspector General, A-17-95-00096 (Washington, DC, 1997). 
See also: Carrie Johnson, “Medicare’s $869 Air Mattress 
Bill; Government Arrests 38 as It Cracks Down on Health-
Care Fraud,” Washington Post, May 10, 2007, p. D1.
18 Ibid.
8low-paid workers do not choose to pay their share and 
participate.  Or, employers can simply close the plant 
or offi  ce and obtain the services from lower-cost labor 
overseas, or from low-cost employers in this country who 
do not provide health insurance.  Th ese policies may 
mitigate employer problems, but they cause serious hu-
man problems, and they do not help forestall the decline 
in EBI.
Employer Responses to Date Have Not Solved the 
Problem.19  Because merely shifting costs to employees is 
a clearly visible dead end, fi rms also have experimented 
with wellness programs, preventive care, and manage-
ment of chronic conditions, backed up with fi nancial in-
centives or even penalties.20  Firms have tried bargaining 
with providers, using health records to promote “evi-
dence-based medicine” to choose the best treatments, 
and creating “high-performance networks” of physicians 
with strong records of cost-effi  cient care.21  However, 
none of these eff orts would change in any fundamental 
way the practice of medicine, or the arguably cost-inef-
fi cient adoption of new and ever-more-expensive health 
technologies.
In sum, the entire U.S. health-care system is built on 
infl ationary foundations – worse still, with limited incen-
tives to keep people healthy.
Proposed Solutions – Past and Present – Do 
Not Work
“Band-Aids.”  For at least 35 years, there has been a 
slowly building realization that our health-care system is 
not sustainable.  Public policymakers and private actors 
19 CED issued its own recommendations for action by em-
ployers, but saw few results.  Research and Policy Com-
mittee of the Committee for Economic Development, A 
New Vision for Health Care: A Leadership Role for Business, 
(New York and Washington, D.C.: Committee for Econom-
ic Development, 2002).
20 Michelle Conlin, “Get Healthy – Or Else,” Business Week, 
February 26, 2007, http://www.businessweek.com/maga-
zine/content/07_09/b4023001.htm?campaign_id=msnbc , 
(accessed May 27, 2010).
21 Marilyn Werber Serafi ni, “Taking Matters into Th eir Own 
Hands,” National Journal, September 30, 2006, pp. 36-40.
have tried to respond, yielding a discouraging history of 
espousing and adopting simplistic and partial “solutions” 
ranging from utilization reviews, or attacks on “waste, 
fraud and abuse,” to “managed care” – veritable “Band-
Aids” on top of a fundamentally fl awed system.  Some of 
these contained germs of good ideas, and some could be 
part of a rational comprehensive solution; but none came 
close to addressing our fundamental problems.  Like-
wise, new ideas such as health information technology 
and electronic health records would help, but would not 
solve the fundamental, systemic weakness in health-care 
delivery.
Consumer-Directed Health Plans (CDHPs).  CDHPs are 
claimed to be something close to a complete answer for 
the problems of the nation’s healthcare system.  CDHPs 
are insurance plans with high deductibles, which the 
consumer must pay before insurance coverage begins.  
Consumers may have health savings accounts (HSAs), 
funded either by themselves or by their employers, to 
pay for care under the deductible.  Because of the high 
deductible, the premium can be lower.  Also because of 
the high deductible, consumers would be expected to en-
gage in preventive care, and then, when illness or injury 
strikes, to use the latest information technology to fi nd 
the most economical and effi  cient therapies and treat-
ments, to minimize their out-of-pocket spending under 
the CDHP deductible, and to protect the balance in their 
HSAs.  In this way, it is claimed, total health-care costs 
would be brought under control.
Th ough CDHPs are better than no coverage at all, they 
are not a complete solution.  Health expenditures are 
very concentrated on relatively few people.22  In any 
given year, well over 80 percent of health expenditure 
dollars will be spent on people who have exceeded their 
deductibles or can safely expect to do so, for any level 
22 M. L. Berk and A. C. Monheit, “Th e Concentration of 
Health Care Expenditures, Revisited,” Health Aff airs 20, no. 
2 (2001): pp. 9-18. 
9of deductibles that is reasonable.23  Many people with 
chronic conditions can expect to reach their deductibles, 
as can anyone who has been an inpatient in a hospital, or 
is likely to enter a hospital.24  Once CDHP enrollees have 
reached their deductibles, they will in eff ect be in cost-
unconscious fee-for-service medicine.  CDHPs will be 
advantageous to those who are both healthy and wealthy, 
because they can both aff ord the higher deductibles and 
take the most advantage of the health savings account 
tax shelter (which benefi ts most those in the highest tax-
rate brackets, but is worth next to nothing to the worst-
off  taxpayers who face a very low or even zero-percent 
tax rate).25  Th e loser may be the fairness of our private 
health-care fi nancing system – not to mention the viabil-
ity of health insurance for those who are not fortunate 
enough to benefi t from CDHPs.
Single Payer, or “Medicare for All.”  Another “big idea” 
for health-system reform is a “single-payer” system, like 
Canada’s.  Probably at the federal level, government 
would serve as the single health insurer, cover everybody, 
and pay all the bills according to a government-deter-
mined or negotiated fee schedule.  Another name could 
be “Medicare for all;” every American would be covered 
by the Medicare program or something very similar.  In 
the United States today, this model has features with 
great appeal, like universal coverage and one billing 
system.
However, the U.S. single-payer system, Medicare, is 
locked into uncoordinated, fragmented fee-for-service 
medicine with the law allowing patient access to any 
willing physician; it has proven practically impossible 
for Medicare to break out of that constraint.  Medicare 
23 In 2002, 80 percent of total health-care expenses were 
spent on the top 20 percent of spenders with spending 
exceeding $3,219.  Mark W. Stanton and the Agency for 
Healthcare Research and Quality, “Th e High Concentra-
tion of U.S. Health Care Expenditures,” Research in Action, 
no. 19 (2006).
24 Ibid.
25 Henry J. Aaron, Patrick Healy, and Surachai Khitatrakun, 
“What’s In a Name?  Are Health Savings Accounts Really 
Health Savings Accounts?”  http://www.americantaxpoli-
cyinstitute.org/pdf/health_conference/Aaron-Healy-Khi-
tatrakun.pdf (accessed May 25, 2010).
fee-for-service has built-in incentives for delivering 
volume, not quality.  It motivates, or is compatible with, 
a great deal of over-use, under-use, and misuse of servic-
es.26  Studies show that Medicare patients in the last six 
months of life in Florida get several times as many doctor 
visits as similar patients in Minnesota, while reporting 
less satisfaction with their care.27
Th us, a single-payer system might provide universal cov-
erage for a time, but costs would surely continue spiral-
ing out of control – as they are in Medicare today – threat-
ening everyone’s coverage.
What Might an Equitable, Effi cient, Universal 
Health-Care Financing and Delivery System 
Look Like?
Th e heart of the solution for health care is competition 
to serve cost-conscious buyers, and incentives for pro-
viders to create and run high-quality, but aff ordable, 
health-care systems.  Competition motivates innovation 
and effi  ciency improvement.  For virtually the entire 
non-health-care economy over the history of the nation, 
competitive pressures have increased quality and tem-
pered prices.  Th e improvements could not be predicted 
in advance.  Consumer choices signaled price standards 
and preferred product and service attributes to the mar-
ketplace, and suppliers improved their processes and 
methods to meet and then to surpass those standards, 
thereby setting new ones.  Even given the unique nature 
of health care, competition provides the best hope for af-
fordable, quality health care.
26 John E. Wennberg and the Dartmouth Atlas Working 
Group, “Th e Dartmouth Atlas Project,” Center for Evalu-
ative Clinical Sciences at Dartmouth Medical School, 
www.dartmouthatlas.org (accessed January 11, 2007).  For 
under-use, see: McGlynn et al., “Th e Quality of Health 
Care,” pp. 2635-2645.  For misuse, see: Kohn, Corrigan, and 
Donaldson, To Err is Human.  
27 J. Wennberg and A. Gittelsohn, “Variations in Medical Care 
Among Small Areas,” Scientifi c American 246, no. 4 (1982): 
pp. 120-134; John E. Wennberg et al., “Changes in Tonsil-
lectomy Rates Associated with Feedback and Review,” 
Pediatrics 59, no. 6, (1977): pp. 821-826.
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Our goal should be adaptive delivery systems that move 
toward the attributes of the modern fi rm in virtually 
every other industry: from unaccountable to account-
able; from uncoordinated to coordinated; from wasteful 
and infl ationary to effi  cient (seeking maximum value for 
money for patients), with incentives for value-enhancing 
innovation; from provider-centric to patient-centric; a 
system focused on keeping people well, at work, and out 
of the hospital; in short, a system committed to improv-
ing health outcomes and reducing health system expen-
ditures, bringing expenditure growth into line with in-
come growth.28  Delivery systems that approximate most 
of these attributes do exist.  True competition among 
insurers and providers will encourage the entire industry 
to improve in all of these dimensions.
Also, to correct the problems created because many 
people lack health insurance, everyone should have 
informed, responsible (that is, cost-conscious) choices 
of health insurance programs that are fi nancially sus-
tainable.  To have effi  cient delivery systems, there must 
be a market for them – that is, a demand for effi  ciency.  
Today, there is virtually no demand for effi  ciency.  If all 
or most people had a reason to choose effi  cient systems, 
care providers would fi nd it necessary to create and off er 
them.  Th us, engaging both patients and providers to 
align incentives is a necessary condition for an effi  cient 
delivery system.  Once the incentives truly are aligned, 
we can expect improvements along the following fronts.
Health-care providers who need to satisfy cost-conscious 
consumers must organize their systems for chronic-care 
management.  As of September 2004, 133 million people, 
almost half of all Americans, live with a chronic condi-
tion.29  Almost half of these people have multiple chronic 
conditions.30  In 2001, the care given to people with 
28 Committee on Quality of Health Care in America, Insti-
tute of Medicine of the National Academies, Crossing the 
Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century 
(Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press, 2001).  
29 Johns Hopkins University and the Robert Wood Johnson 
Foundation, “Chronic Conditions: Making the Case for 
Ongoing Care, September 2004 Update,” Partnership for 
Solutions, www.partnershipforsolutions.org (accessed 
August 17, 2006).  
30 Ibid.
chronic conditions accounted for 83 percent of health-
care spending.31  Today’s health-care and payment sys-
tems are designed to manage and pay for acute episodes, 
not chronic conditions.  Fee-for-service generally pays 
for episodes such as doctor visits or procedures, not for 
on-going preventive and chronic care such as counseling 
sessions.
Chronic disease often arises from the failure to engage 
in good health behaviors – such as obesity prevention, 
exercise, diabetes control, smoking cessation, and 
prevention methods such as cancer screening.32  
Resources could be saved in the long run by systems 
that emphasize primary care, disease prevention 
and early detection and treatment.  Fee-for-service 
generates unusual income opportunities for doctors in 
specialties such as oncology and radiology, and poor pay 
for primary care – leading progressively fewer graduates 
of American medical schools to seek careers in primary 
care.  Th e other stages of the continuum of health-care 
delivery, procedures, catastrophic care, and end-of-life 
care, also could be improved in quality and cost in the 
same way – through system coordination across teams 
and error avoidance.
Although the share of health spending on patients in 
their last year of life has often been exaggerated, it re-
mains signifi cant: it is about 30 percent of Medicare, and 
Medicare is about 17 percent of national health expendi-
tures.  Th ere is substantial regional variation.  Th e high-
spending regions spend 60 percent more per patient and 
provide more services than the low-spending regions, but 
Medicare enrollees in higher-spending regions do not 
experience better health outcomes or satisfaction with 
care.33  Providers in a cost-conscious system will need to 
develop more-humane alternatives for end-of-life care 
31 Ibid.
32 Denise Grady, “Second Drop in Cancer Deaths Could 
Point to a Trend, Researchers Say,” New York Times, Janu-
ary 18, 2007, p. A14.
33 Elliott S. Fisher et al., “Th e Implications of Regional Varia-
tions in Medicare Spending,” pts. 1 and 2, Annals of Inter-
nal Medicine 138, no. 4 (2003): pp. 273-298.
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that are less specialist- and ICU-intensive than the acute 
inpatient setting.34
Th e huge fl ow of medical information (over 10,000 ran-
domized trials are published each year) is beyond the 
grasp of solo or small group practitioners.  A successful 
system must translate this information into up-to-date 
science-based best-practice guidelines and conve-
niently integrate them into actual care delivery.  Health 
information technology can include caregiver support 
tools – such as shared comprehensive electronic health 
records, guidelines, prompts, and reminders – to monitor 
performance and take corrective actions.  Care should be 
delivered in the least-costly appropriate settings, con-
sidering total system costs, not just costs and revenues 
associated with one setting – with smooth transitions and 
hand-off s between care settings, so that, for example, 
outpatient providers are well-informed on inpatient care 
(and vice versa).
Although this restructuring would radically change 
America’s health-care delivery system, each of these 
expectations is nonetheless reasonable on its face – no 
more than what one would reasonably expect from a 
well-run world-class competitive company that adapts 
to technology and market challenges and opportunities 
in any other sector of the economy.  It is highly question-
able whether the recently enacted reform law will move 
the U.S. health-care system measurably in this direction 
– at least, without the most informed implementation 
of the key provisions that are most similar to the ideas 
discussed in the following section of this report.
34 RAND Health, “Redefi ning and Reforming Health Care 
for the Last Years of Life,” RAND Corporation, 2006, 
http://www.rand.org/pubs/research_briefs/2006/RAND_
RB9178.pdf (accessed May 5, 2009). 

13
Essentials of Market-Based Universal Health 
Insurance with Consumer Choice of Health Plan
CED has proposed a system of market-based universal 
health insurance – which eliminates the current sys-
tem’s distortions by giving each consumer a choice of 
diff erent plans and a fi xed-dollar credit to purchase the 
plan of his or her choice.  With this system, consumers 
have an incentive to be cost-conscious.  We believe that 
competition among private insurance plans, to attract 
informed, cost- and quality-conscious consumers, is 
the only way to achieve sustainable, aff ordable, qual-
ity health care for all Americans.  By reforming the 
fi nancing system for health coverage, we can create the 
incentives that will drive insurers and providers to reform 
the health delivery system.
Th e nation can achieve such a market for quality, aff ord-
able health care through two key steps:
In the fi rst step, the federal government should estab-
lish independent regional “exchanges” that would 
provide a single point of entry for each individual to 
choose among competing private health plans.  Th e 
markets for health insurance and health-care delivery 
are unique.  Competition is possible, but the nature of 
these markets does mean that the competitive process 
needs rules – much as do the markets for other insurance 
products or for securities, for example – to be effi  cient 
and fair.  To provide those rules, we propose a health-in-
surance “exchange,” which would improve on the current 
Federal Employees Health Benefi ts Plan (FEHBP) – the 
system that also covers members of Congress – and also 
on the less-robust exchanges called for in the new law.  
Every individual would be guaranteed the right to choose 
one from a range of private insurance plans.  Every plan 
would be required to meet the comprehensive standards 
set by the exchange; only quality plans with broad cover-
age may compete.  Health insurers and providers would 
be free to use alternative delivery system models.
It would be essential that wide-access PPO plans be 
available, so that everyone who wanted to continue 
with such coverage and with his or her own physi-
cian could do so; every consumer could “keep what 
he (or she) has.”  Plans could charge no diff erence in 
premium for age or preexisting conditions (unlike the 
current individual insurance market).  Th ese exchanges 
would set standards for plans to ensure quality, com-
prehensive coverage, and consumer protection through 
standardized “fi ne print.”  Each exchange would provide 
side-by-side plan comparisons, and would organize an 
annual open season at which individuals could change 
plans – introducing competition into the marketplace for 
health insurance and care.  Each exchange would “risk-
adjust” premium revenue to insurers – that is, pay more 
to insurers that cover relatively more people with expen-
sive conditions.  Risk adjustment is already undertaken 
by insurers in some private systems that resemble what 
we propose and has just been adopted for the private 
Medicare insurers.
Th e exchanges would be supervised by a “Health Fed,” 
modeled on the independence and structure of the Fed-
eral Reserve, which would be established at the outset 
to guide and facilitate the creation of the exchanges.  
Th e Health Fed would be funded independently (as is 
the Federal Reserve), by a small surcharge on insur-
ance premiums; its independent funding is essential, to 
ensure that it is insulated from politics, and that it can 
react quickly to market challenges and opportunities and 
to technological change.  Th e Health Fed would collect 
initial data to evaluate proposed insurance plans and to 
establish and improve risk adjustment.  It would set stan-
dards for performance disclosure by plans and provid-
ers.  Th e Health Fed would create an Institute for Medical 
Outcomes and Technology Assessment to evaluate the 
comparative costs and benefi ts of technologies and care 
practices, and report to health providers and the pub-
lic.  Th ere would be an option of national (not just state) 
regulation of health insurance plans to facilitate competi-
tion and innovation.  In sum, the exchange system would 
perform a role very similar to, but we believe improving 
upon, that now performed by the Offi  ce of Personnel 
Management for the Federal Employees Health Benefi ts 
Plan.
Second, subject to progress of the exchanges and the 
willingness of the public to provide the fi nancing, 
every household would receive a fi xed-dollar credit 
suffi  cient to purchase the low-priced quality health 
plan off ered in its region.  Every individual, therefore, 
would be able to buy quality health insurance at no 
out-of-pocket cost, and coverage would be universal.  
Summary of the CED Position on Health-Care Policy
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As an alternative to the low-price plan, an individual or 
household could choose to purchase a more-expensive 
plan by paying the additional cost above the low-priced 
plan, using after-tax dollars.  Such fi xed-dollar contri-
butions have been used with success in the employer 
context by Hewlett Packard, Wells Fargo, the University 
of California, and Stanford University, and the states of 
Washington, Wisconsin, and California.  Th e fi xed-dollar 
credit would be fi nanced by eliminating the current ex-
clusion for employer-provided insurance, and by broadly 
based tax revenues – for example a payroll, value-added 
or environmental tax.  In eff ect, every individual in the 
nation would contribute toward the health-insurance 
program, and every individual would be entitled to insur-
ance – without costly “mandates” or means-testing.
With every individual assured access to a quality in-
surance plan, and able to pocket the full savings from 
choosing a low-priced plan, insurers would for the fi rst 
time have an incentive to organize with health provid-
ers to off er quality, aff ordable care that people – not 
their employers – want.  Together, the health-insurance 
exchange and the fi xed-dollar contributions to individu-
als would lead naturally to a competitive marketplace 
among health-care providers and insurance plans.  Every 
consumer would have insurance and an incentive to 
choose the plan that provides what he or she believes to 
be the best combination of quality and value for money, 
because he or she would be responsible for costs beyond 
the fi xed-dollar contribution.  Consumers could change 
plans freely at annual open seasons if they were dissatis-
fi ed.  Th erefore, to attract and to keep customers, plans 
would need to be adaptive to pursue effi  ciency and qual-
ity, which would create meaningful competition in the 
health-care marketplace, driven by fair rules to reward 
quality and cost-eff ectiveness, rather than denying care 
and selecting risks.  Rules-based competition has driven 
progress in every other industry in our economy and 
around the world, and competition shows the greatest 
promise of turning health care from its current path of 
unsustainable cost growth, mediocre quality, deteriorat-
ing health, and declining coverage.
With health plans competing to attract cost-conscious 
consumers, we can expect our health-care system to 
change for the better.  Health providers would be ac-
countable for quality and cost.  To remain aff ordable 
while maintaining quality for their customers, providers 
would move away from fee-for-service episodic treat-
ment to emphasizing primary care, health promotion, 
disease prevention, early detection and treatment, 
chronic disease management, and cost-reducing innova-
tion and process improvement – which would include 
effi  cient use of technology, such as electronic medical 
records, knowledge management, and computerized 
caregiver support tools; better use of physicians’ time, in 
part through team practice with non-M.D. profession-
als; matching resources to the needs of the populations 
served; and regional concentration of complex care, to 
achieve expertise and economies of scale.  To control 
costs, providers would need to avoid confl icts of inter-
est, and use the best possible evaluation of the effi  cacy of 
treatments and therapies.
Th is design would focus competition on value for money 
in the informed best judgment of consumers, and not in 
any way pick winners and losers in advance.  Th e com-
petitive market would do that, over time.  Th e system 
should encourage diff ering delivery modes to foster com-
petition and innovation.  In the end, some existing mod-
els might be winners in the competitive marketplace, or 
the winners might be entirely new, as-yet-unimagined 
models.  One thing would be certain: the outcome would 
be better than what has gone before because the incen-
tives and opportunities for consumers to make econo-
mizing choices, and the need for insurers and providers 
to seek improvement to satisfy consumers, would be 
enormously increased.
Th e Cost of a Reformed Health-Insurance System.  
Universal coverage would increase the number of people 
seeking services, but cost-conscious consumers would 
gradually migrate toward less-expensive plans; and all 
plans would seek effi  ciencies to reduce their premiums.  
Th us, it is not certain whether market-based universal 
health insurance would cost the nation more or less than 
government, businesses and individuals now collectively 
pay.
Without a full actuarial assessment, we can draw infer-
ences from basically similar legislation proposed by 
Senators Ron Wyden (D-OR) and Robert F. Bennett 
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(R-UT) (which does diff er in some signifi cant details).35  
Th eir bill is estimated to reduce total national health-care 
spending by a small percentage in the fi rst year, rising 
to 7.7 percent in the tenth year, compared to continu-
ing with the existing system.  Th e savings would be the 
net of costs for additional services for the newly insured, 
more than off set by savings from the incentives of price 
competition for consumers and insurers, and additional 
savings in administration.  In other words, according to 
this analysis of a system of responsible, cost-conscious 
consumer choice, the issue is not how much the nation 
spends on health care, but who pays a smaller total; if 
the nation can use the resources that are now devoted 
to health care – by employers, households, and govern-
ments – then it can aff ord coverage for all, with money 
left over, and the savings would grow over time.  How-
ever, mobilizing all of the resources now used for health 
care would be a non-trivial task.  We believe that such a 
fi nancing solution is attainable.
Eff ects on the Health-Care Industry.  Th e health-care 
industry is now about one-sixth of the U.S. economy.  
Any marked change in the structure of that industry 
would have correspondingly large impacts.  In the broad-
est sense, improvements in the effi  ciency of delivering 
health care, like those for any other good or service, 
would make the economy and the nation as a whole 
better off .  Process improvement in healthcare delivery 
likely would reduce (or reduce the rate of growth of) 
the 16 percent of the GDP that is now devoted to health 
care.  However, every dollar of that 16 percent of the 
GDP is income to those who work in the industry today.  
If that share declines, some people’s incomes will de-
cline, and some people may lose their jobs altogether.  
Society should be sensitive to these eff ects, but concern 
about those dislocations should not prevent progress 
for all.  Th e deteriorating current system has left grow-
ing millions of people without insurance coverage, to the 
detriment of their health and of the health-care system.  
Inaction would merely extend that deterioration.
35 John Sheils, Randall Haught, and Evelyn Murphy, “Cost 
and Coverage Estimates for the ‘Healthy Americans Act,’” 
(working paper, Lewin Group, Falls Church, VA, December 
12, 2006), http://wyden.senate.gov/Healthy_Americans_
Act/HAA_Cost_Coverage_Report.pdf. 
In fact, many segments of the health-care sector would 
benefi t from reform.  Physicians and other providers of 
health care would be better off  having more people cov-
ered as users (and reliable payers) for their products and 
services.  At the same time, of course, those fi rms and 
individuals would face greater competition, and more 
scrutiny of the effi  cacy of treatments and procedures.  
But in sum, the outlook for stable growth would be much 
improved under a system of sustainable and universal 
coverage.  Th ose individuals and fi rms willing to compete 
should welcome such reform.
Other sectors of the economy – insurers, employers, and 
state and local governments – would be aff ected in vary-
ing ways, but in the end benefi ted by a sound health-care 
system.
How Might We Get There?  A Path to Consumer-
Choice-Driven Universal Health Insurance in 
Feasible Incremental Steps
Our political process much prefers incremental move-
ment to sudden, large, discontinuous changes whose 
consequences cannot be foreseen.  Still, the problems 
of cost, quality and access have become so serious that 
the needed changes to our health-care fi nancing and 
delivery system are fundamental and far-reaching.  Such 
restructuring through a political process that values sta-
bility would require bold but feasible incremental steps 
that could produce steady progress, and in the end get us 
to Market-Based Universal Health Insurance.  We recom-
mend a three-step process.
Phase I: Building the Foundations for Responsible 
Choice.  To create an administrative structure, 
modernize and adapt the FEHBP into a framework for 
a national system of health-insurance exchanges.  Use 
fi xed-dollar contributions to encourage responsible 
choice; introduce risk adjustment; establish a minimum 
benefi t standard for all plans; and allow premiums to 
vary by region.  To ease market entry in many locations 
across the country, to make the system more competitive 
and less costly, and to eliminate confl icts between state 
and federal health-insurance regulation, modernize and 
simplify health insurance regulation by creating an 
alternative federal regulatory system that participating 
multi-state health plans can choose instead of being 
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regulated by states.  To perform such regulation, 
build a new independent agency – a “Health Fed” 
– patterned on the Federal Reserve Board and the 
Securities and Exchange Commission.  To provide 
authoritative scientifi c information about the value and 
costs of clinical interventions, create a national institute 
for medical outcomes and technology assessment.  
And to reverse the recent growth in the number of the 
uninsured, expand existing safety-net programs, 
especially the State Children’s Health Insurance Program 
(SCHIP), pending the availability of true universal 
coverage.
Phase II: Progressively Expand the Availability of 
Coverage.  To begin transforming the employment-
based insurance system into a wide range of responsible 
choices of carrier and delivery system, include all 
small employers (up to 50 or 100 employees) in a 
new exchange system, building on the FEHBP.  Small 
employers need the most help to provide coverage to 
their workers, and will benefi t from participation in 
the exchange.  To maintain a large, sound risk pool, 
require that those small fi rms purchase their insurance 
through the exchange to keep the tax exclusion for 
employer premiums.  Include the self-employed, and 
even entire states that choose to opt in.  Progressively 
expand the employment group size ceiling for the new 
system until all employers are included.  To create 
cost-consciousness, and to save billions of tax dollars 
to help low-income people buy insurance, cap the tax 
exclusion for employer health benefi ts at the level of an 
effi  cient health plan in each region.  Further, to maintain 
cost-consciousness, prohibit employers from selectively 
subsidizing the purchase of more-expensive health 
plans by their employees.  Employers must give any such 
subsidy to all of their employees, not only those who 
choose more-expensive insurance; and employers must 
allow their employees to take the subsidy in cash, rather 
than insurance premiums, if they so choose.  Finally, 
expand the functions of the “Health Fed” to include 
setting standards for performance disclosure and risk 
adjustment.
Phase III: Achieve Market-Based Universal Health 
Insurance.  To complete the transition to universal health 
insurance, replace all employer contributions with univer-
sal ﬁ xed-dollar contributions paid for with broad-based 
tax revenues.  To help ﬁ nance this, eliminate any tax break 
for employer-paid health insurance.
In sum, the program outlined here has, we believe, the 
greatest prospect of reaching the three goals of restrain-
ing health-care expenditures, achieving universal insur-
ance coverage, and improving quality – thus completing 
the task that was attempted in the recent eff ort at reform.  
It relies on incentives for individuals to choose both 
plans and providers that off er what those individuals 
judge to be the best combination of quality and price.  In 
response, insurers and care providers will have the stron-
gest incentive to increase quality and restrain prices, 
creating a new dynamic toward improvement.  Th ose 
consumers who prefer today’s model of care would be 
able to keep it, if they were willing to pay any diff erence 
in price.  However, by current indications, most people 
would be happy to consider new, evolving, and improv-
ing delivery modes that emphasize maintaining health 
through preventive care and healthy behavior, early 
intervention against and sustained control of chronic 
diseases, and use of contemporary digital technology and 
communications.
Merely extending coverage – even to universal coverage 
– under the current system would not solve the core 
problem, because with the cost of coverage growing 
faster than the economy’s capacity to pay it, no coverage 
is secure.  Command-and-control systems have a poor 
track record in modern economies; and medical care 
is too complex to devolve all authority to the individual 
patient.  Market-based universal health insurance, with 
individuals choosing the health plans and delivery 
systems that they deem best, shows great promise – 
much greater than any alternative.
Th e health-reform debate is not over.  For the simplest 
and clearest indication, the Congressional Budget Offi  ce 
estimates that the recently enacted health-care law 
will reduce federal budget defi cits by about 0.5 percent 
of the GDP in its second decade.36  However, it is also 
projected that ten years from now, under current policy, 
the budget defi cit will be nearly 7 percent of the GDP – 
36 Congressional Budget Offi  ce, letter to the Honorable 
Nancy Pelosi, March 20, 2010, page 12, http://www.cbo.
gov/ftpdocs/113xx/doc11379/AmendReconProp.pdf.
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well beyond what is sustainable – and the public debt will 
have approached 100 percent of the GDP – a clear danger 
sign.37  Th e 0.5 percent of GDP saved by health reform is 
only a small fraction of the 7 percent of GDP defi cit – and 
experts have said for years that health care is the biggest 
part of the defi cit and debt problem, and must be the 
biggest part of the solution.  Nor is the new law designed 
to change the dominance of employer coverage, or the 
effi  ciency of health care delivered through employer-
provided insurance.  Th e CBO estimates that the number 
of persons with employer-provided insurance will be 
little aff ected, decreasing after 10 years by only about 2 
percent.38  Also, the new law would have no signifi cant 
direct eff ect of inducing greater effi  ciency in private, 
employer-provided health insurance in the foreseeable 
future.39  Rather, the enacted reform is intended to 
induce process improvements in Medicare through the 
development and ultimate enforcement of pilot projects, 
and later to have those improvements fi lter through 
to the private practice of medicine by example.40  Th is 
process relies on a series of uncertain developments, and 
even if it succeeds, will take years.
For these reasons, CED believes that health reform 
must be revisited, and that the issues we have studied in 
California are important for the ultimate sustainability of 
health care for the entire country.
37 Committee for Economic Development, “Th e Debt Clock 
Is Ticking,” http://www.ced.org/images/library/presenta-
tions/minarik/webinarfeb10.pdf.
38 Congressional Budget Offi  ce, letter to the Honorable 
Nancy Pelosi, op. cit., Table 4, page 21.
39 Th e major provision that might be so characterized, the 
so-called “Cadillac Tax” on high-cost plans, will not take 
eff ect until 2018.  Th e legislation would also create a pri-
vate, non-profi t organization for patient-centered health 
research, which as a totally new entity would take some 
time to bear fruit.
40 For example, all of the major initiatives cited by OMB Di-
rector Peter R. Orszag (“Following Doctor’s Orders,” April 
1, 2010, http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/blog/10/04/01/
Following-DoctorOrders/), apart from the two mentioned 
in the previous footnote, could aff ect private health care 
only indirectly, through their impact on Medicare.
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Reasons for CED Interest in California
California is highly pertinent to CED’s vision of health 
reform for several important reasons.
Presence of systems similar to the CED model.  As 
noted earlier, most of the employer systems that are simi-
lar to the health-system model envisioned by CED are 
located in California – including the University of Cali-
fornia and Stanford University, Wells Fargo, and Hewlett-
Packard.  Each of these employers off ers its employees 
fi xed-dollar contributions, with which the employees 
can choose from a menu of alternative health-insurance 
plans.
In addition to these employer systems, the CalPERS 
system, which generally shares these major attributes, is 
also similar in important ways to the kind of state-based 
insurance exchange that is contemplated in the legisla-
tion now before the Congress, as well as to the regional 
exchanges advocated by CED.  CalPERS’ experience 
could shed light on the problems and potential of a state-
level exchange, which could be useful whether the cur-
rent debate moves toward a CED-type system or not.
A big market.  California is large enough that there 
would be no peculiarities of small size that would raise 
problems in extrapolating from its experience to the 
likely environment facing a national health reform.
A diverse employer base.  California is home to busi-
nesses in every industry, from agriculture to fi nance to 
technology, in urban and rural environments.  Th e state 
exports and imports.  It can shed light on many of the pit-
falls and opportunities that would face a national reform.
Diverse providers and plans.  Th e employers that follow 
the CED model of consumer-responsible choice of insur-
ance plans can off er their employees a wide range of 
choices.  In addition to conventional fee-for-service-type 
plans, California also has varieties of competing inte-
grated delivery systems, described below.  Conversations 
with those plans and their associated providers can yield 
insights into how the national market might react to in-
troduction of a more market-driven health-care system.
National problems of costs and apparent (limited) 
progress in California.  A major motivating factor in 
the current national health-reform debate is the unsus-
tainable growth of costs.  Although Californians would 
certainly describe their cost growth as excessive, in fact it 
has been less rapid than in the rest of the country.  Th at 
may be as a result of the diverse market, with diff erent 
types of plans that compete against each other in at least 
some of the systems (including the ones enumerated 
above that follow the general lines of the CED model).  
Conversations about the results of competition could be 
enlightening.
Eff orts at reform in California.  Because California has 
made its own attempt to reform the health-care system 
within its borders, its employers and providers may have 
thought more closely about the issues that will be perti-
nent to national reform.  Th is could yield some possible 
clues as to employer concerns and attitudes toward 
reform in the rest of the country, as well as possible clues 
as to good practices for a reformed system for the country 
at large.
The California Health-Care Market
Several large employment groups (the state of California 
with about 700,000 lives, the University of California with 
about 180,000 lives, Stanford University with 23,000 lives, 
and Wells Fargo and Hewlett Packard), use a managed 
competition model, following the broad lines of the CED 
vision, for employee health care.  In all of these cases, 
the management is satisfi ed with the model, happy they 
adopted it, and is not even thinking of going back to the 
industrial “single-payer” model, or to the employer off er-
ing choices but paying more for fee-for-service coverage.  
Th ese groups save money because a very high percent-
age of employees, usually around 80 percent, fi nd the 
best value for money is in the comparatively low-priced 
HMOs.  Only the minority of 20 percent who choose fee-
for-service must see value for money there, because they 
are willing to bear the cost diff erence.
Although these systems seem large, they are not large 
enough to have “bent the cost curve” or slowed its growth 
to sustainable rates on a national scale.  However, they 
have made some progress at the state level.  Although it 
is a large, costly, industrialized state, California health 
California And Health-Care Reform
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spending per person is 12 percent below the national 
average and about 30 percent below Massachusetts and 
New York.  Th e annual growth of cost in California from 
1991 to 2004 was about 4.4 percent, compared with 5.7 
percent and 5.8 percent in Massachusetts and New York, 
respectively.
California HMOs include Kaiser Permanente, a “delivery 
system HMO” with 5.3 million California “commercial” 
(i.e., non-Medicare, non-Medicaid) members in 2007.  
Th ere are also seven “carrier HMOs,” with a total of nearly 
fi ve million California commercial members.41 Th is latter 
group is characterized as the “California delegated mod-
el,” because in their coverage, medical decisions are del-
egated to physician organizations that are at risk at least 
for professional services.  (For more detail, see “Problems 
of Incomplete Incentives Alignment in California Del-
egated Model HMOs,” attached as an Appendix.)
Despite this competition, the overall market remains 
dominated by one or another form of “cost-unconscious 
demand” – in the form of either a single fee-for-service 
plan for the employment group, or a choice of plans with 
the employer paying 80 to 100 percent of the premium of 
the plan of the employee’s choice.  Th e latter approach 
is predominant in biotech companies, and unionized 
public-sector employees other than state employees.  
Th is cost-unconscious demand helps to drive up the cost 
of labor, physician services, hospital services, and so on.
Beyond the prevalence of the cost-unconscious demand 
sector, which is the most important, several other factors 
contribute to the failure of HMO competition to produce 
the desired result of expenditure growth at sustainable 
rates:
Th e importance of provider market power.  Th e Sutter 
Health System has expanded to 26 hospitals in Northern 
California strategically placed so that none of the carrier 
HMOs can have a viable product without contracting 
with Sutter.  And Sutter will not allow them to contract 
with one or a few without contracting with them all.  
41 Th ere are confl icting enrollment data.  Th ese fi gures are 
from the California Offi  ce of the Patient Advocate; IHA 
data are somewhat diff erent.  We believe that the diff er-
ences are not large enough to aff ect the broad conclusions.
Sutter is well known as a very-high-cost hospital sys-
tem.  A few years ago, CalPERS publicly battled them 
and demanded more reasonable rates.  When CalPERS 
was unsuccessful, they directed the Blue Shield HMO to 
drop 24 California hospitals from its network for CalPERS 
members.  “CalPERS board president Sean Harrigan said 
hospitalization rates sought by Sutter were too high and 
eliminating the most expensive facilities would result 
in CalPERS members paying lower monthly premiums.  
‘Premium increases exceeding 50 percent in the past 
three years are simply unsustainable,’ Harrigan said.  
‘Almost half our cost increases are driven by hospital 
charges.’ … CalPERS took the unusual action to exclude 
certain hospitals after an audit showed higher prices 
in general at Sutter facilities, in some cases 80 percent 
higher than average costs at hospitals statewide.  CalP-
ERS also complained that Sutter required that insurers 
include all 26 Sutter facilities rather than separating them 
by region.”42  Clearly, such instances of market power can 
make cost control infi nitely more diffi  cult, both in-state 
and nationally.
Th e importance of transparency.  A related problem in 
California is that hospitals make it very diffi  cult for health 
plans and consumers to compare their costs.  Th us, it can 
be very diffi  cult to isolate them in the marketplace and to 
make these hospitals bear the market consequences of 
their costs.  For example, Sutter demands contract provi-
sions with HMOs that prevent them from placing Sutter 
in a higher-cost tier.
Th e importance of incentives and the organization of 
markets.  Th ere are signifi cant imperfections in the align-
ment of incentives between health plans and medical 
groups in the California delegated model.  For example, 
the choice of capitation rate paid by the health plan to 
the medical group is a zero sum game.  Th ey have no mu-
tual interest in raising or lowering it.  Th is is in contrast 
to, for example, Kaiser Permanente, whose Health Plan 
has an interest in a well-paid successful medical group, 
and whose medical group has an interest in the health 
plan charging an aff ordable premium that will attract 
members.  In the delegated model, usually the medical 
groups have little or no fi nancial interest in the economi-
42 Bleys W. Rose, “CalPERS Shuns Sutter Hospitals,” Th e Press 
Democrat, August 10, 2004, page 1.
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cal use of resources such as hospital and pharmacy.  And 
because the medical groups in the delegated model lack 
mutual exclusivity, investments made by one health 
plan in one group, such as in information systems, create 
benefi ts that accrue to the six other health plans that are 
the health plan’s competitors.  (Again, see the Appendix, 
“Problems of Incomplete Incentives Alignment in Cali-
fornia Delegated Model HMOs.”)
California Attitudes Toward Health Care
According to the most recent Field Poll, popular attitudes 
toward health care in California track closely those in 
the nation at large.43  Forty-eight percent of Californians, 
a plurality, are dissatisfi ed with the current health-care 
system, slightly larger than the share (45 percent) report-
ing that they are satisfi ed.  Th ose who are dissatisfi ed are 
more intense in their feelings (24 percent are very dis-
satisfi ed, and 25 percent somewhat dissatisfi ed; only 14 
percent are very satisfi ed, with 31 percent somewhat sat-
isfi ed).  A majority (54 percent) of California voters report 
that they are very concerned that they or someone close 
to them will lose (or have already lost) their coverage.
In assessing the urgency, 32 percent of Californians be-
lieve that the health-care system needs to be completely 
rebuilt; 39 percent are just short of that, asking for fun-
damental changes.  Another 23 percent say that minor 
changes are needed.  U.S. opinion is only slightly stron-
ger, according to a March national survey, with a total of 
76 percent asking for at least fundamental changes.  In 
terms of timing, 67 percent of Californians say that it is 
more important than ever to take on health reform now 
– more than the percentage (62 percent) so responding 
among the population of the nation as a whole.  Fifty-
seven percent of Californians say that the country would 
be better off  with health reform.
In terms of simple questions about the policy choices, 
Californians do tend to favor options that would entail 
costs; few polls, of course, attempt to tie the policy steps 
needed to pay such costs.  Eighty-nine percent favor tax 
43 Field Research Corporation, “Large Majorities of Cali-
fornians Believe the Nation’s Health Care System Needs 
Fundamental changes or Should Be Completely Rebuilt,” 
Release #2308, June 18, 2009.
breaks or other incentives for businesses who off er plans; 
76 percent approve of tax credits to moderate income 
individuals who buy insurance.  Eighty-fi ve percent agree 
with choices among competing public and private health 
plans.  Eighty-three percent approve of savings on insur-
ance for individuals who follow healthy lifestyles.  Eighty-
one percent would require insurers to off er coverage 
without regard to pre-existing health conditions, but 70 
percent disapprove of requiring individuals to purchase 
coverage.  Sixty-four percent disapprove of giving people 
fi xed amounts of money to purchase insurance on their 
own instead of having employer coverage.  (CED is sensi-
tive to the distinction, probably not appreciated by all, 
between purchasing insurance in the individual market 
and purchasing it from an exchange, such as in the Fed-
eral Employees Health Benefi ts Plan.)
Precisely half of Californians (and 49 percent of all 
Americans) poll as willing to pay higher taxes to provide 
coverage to all Americans; very nearly equal percent-
ages are opposed.  Seventy percent oppose increasing 
the defi cit to fi nance health reform.  But when it comes 
to specifi c ideas to pay the bill, few policies meet with 
approval.  Only tax increases on families with incomes 
of over $250,000 per year – either limits on tax deduc-
tions or repeal of the Bush tax cuts – achieve majority 
approval.  A cap on the deduction for health insurance 
premiums by employers reached plurality support, but 
other ideas, including a value-added tax or reducing the 
employer-premium exclusion for employees – are op-
posed by majorities.
Th irty-eight percent of Californians prefer to receive their 
insurance from their employers, as opposed to 28 percent 
favoring government, and 26 percent preferring personal 
responsibility.  Th irty-four percent would replace the 
current system with a government-run program, whereas 
43 percent prefer reforms within the framework of the 
current system, and 18 percent would rely on free-market 
competition.
In sum, Californians are less than satisfi ed with the cur-
rent health-insurance system, but seem far from settled 
on an alternative.  Learning more about the workings of 
the system and its alternatives is essential.
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California Small Business Attitudes Toward 
Health Care
A 2009 survey undertaken by the advocacy group Small 
Business Majority assessed the attitudes of entrepreneurs 
toward health care.44  Th e survey shed light on the prob-
lems that the small business community has in address-
ing the health-care needs of its owners and employees.
In California, more than half (55 percent) of small busi-
nesses do not pay for health-care coverage for their em-
ployees.  Th e smaller the business, in terms of number of 
employees (one to three) or revenue (less than $250,000 
annually), the greater the probability of not contributing 
(65 percent and 75 percent, respectively).  Greater than 
average percentages of Latino, rural, and young (aged 
under 55 years) business owners (66 percent, 59 percent, 
and 58 percent respectively) do not contribute.  Th is is so 
even though 62 percent (31 percent strongly, 31 percent 
somewhat) agree that companies have a responsibility to 
provide coverage.  Cost is clearly the major reason why 
small businesses fi nd it hard to contribute toward cover-
age.  Eighty-six percent of fi rms that do not contribute say 
that they cannot aff ord to do so; 70 percent of those that 
do contribute say that they struggle to fi nd the money.  
Small business owners in general, and Latino, rural, and 
young entrepreneurs in particular, say that they have dif-
fi culties in getting aff ordable coverage and quality care.
Small business owners see health care as an important 
economic issue.  Forty-two percent strongly agree, and 
19 percent somewhat agree, that health-care reform 
is important for getting the economy back on track.  
Women and young business owners are the most likely to 
hold this view.
Small-business entrepreneurs see a government role in a 
solution, although there are characteristic diff erences in 
the perceived nature of that role.  Forty-three percent see 
a shared responsibility of employers, consumers and gov-
ernment in make health care more aff ordable; 18 percent 
want government to provide health-insurance coverage 
directly.  Again, women and young business owners feel 
44 Small Business Majority, “Report: California Small Busi-
ness Healthcare Survey,” August 27, 2009.
most strongly that government action is called for (68 
percent and 64 percent, respectively).
In terms of policy solutions, a substantial majority (63 
percent strongly, 24 percent somewhat) agree that 
pre-existing conditions should not aff ect eligibility for 
coverage.  Equally substantial majorities agree that 
restrictions of coverage for pre-existing conditions 
inhibit entrepreneurship.  Th e largest positive response 
(50 percent) among alternative criteria held that the top 
priority of health reform is controlling costs.  Eighty-
three percent (63 percent strongly, and 20 percent 
somewhat) want preventive medicine to be used to 
control costs.  A large majority (58 percent strongly, 23 
percent somewhat) support a marketplace where small 
businesses and individuals could choose their coverage.  
Two-thirds (66 percent) believe that marketplace should 
off er both private and public plans; 24 percent want 
private plans only, and 7 percent want only public plans.  
A majority (35 percent strongly, 33 percent somewhat) 
support shared responsibility among individuals, 
employers, insurance companies, providers, and 
government to make coverage more aff ordable.
Clearly, California small-business owners, like the public 
at large, believe that our health-care system must be 
improved.
Employer Attitudes Toward National Reform
Of course, most larger fi rms have multi-state operations, 
and so identifying a large business solely with California 
is problematic.  Th is report includes interviews with a 
smaller group of California-based executives, but this 
eff ort is not intended to construct a scientifi c sample.  
Rather, it includes in-depth interviews that provide in-
sights into fi rm policies and their likely interaction with 
public-policy reform in health care.
However, the Committee for Economic Development 
conducted its own survey of the attitudes of 300 business 
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executives at large toward the health-insurance system.45  
Th e respondents clearly are concerned about health care. 
Fifty-four percent of those business leaders said that it 
is more diffi  cult than fi ve years ago to provide health-
insurance coverage for their employees, while 39 percent 
that that it is about the same as fi ve years ago.  Fifty-eight 
percent expect that providing coverage will be more 
diffi  cult fi ve years from now; 30 percent expect it to be 
about the same.  Fifty-six percent believe that providing 
health insurance helps them to compete for talent in 
the labor market, but only 14 percent believe that it 
helps them to sell their output; 37 percent believe that 
providing health insurance makes them less competitive.  
Seventy-four percent say that their fi rms have been 
forced to take action to address rising health-care costs.
Th is level of concern leads to one of the most striking 
fi ndings of the poll, especially given the tendency of 
business to support the employer-based insurance 
system.  Th irty-six percent of respondents strongly 
agree, and 26 percent somewhat agree, that “the current 
employer-based healthcare system in the United States is 
not sustainable in the long term.”
Questions about preferences for public policy and 
health-care reform showed that the views of business 
leaders are as divided as those of the public at large.  
However, when presented with a range of options, ex-
tending from a “single-payer” public insurance system 
to sending all consumers into the individual market, 
the strongest support (18 percent very supportive, and 
42 percent somewhat supportive) came for a system, 
like CED’s, following the general outlines of the Federal 
Employees Health Benefi ts Plan, which serves Members 
of Congress.  And 81 percent (42 percent strongly, 39 per-
cent somewhat) agreed with a more-specifi c statement 
of the CED plan: “Every American with good healthcare 
should be able to keep the coverage that he or she has, 
but every American also should have more choices 
among private insurance plans.  Th ose plans should be 
portable when people change jobs.  And every American 
45 Committee for Economic Development, “Poll Shows Busi-
ness Leaders Want a Bold New Direction in Health-Care 
Reform,” June 24, 2009, http://www.ced.org/news-events/
health-care/351-poll-shows-business-leaders-want-a-
bold-new-direction-in-health-care-reform .
should be able to save money if he or she makes a wise 
choice among those alternative health-care plans.”
Clearly, health insurance is complex, and people’s prefer-
ences diff er in many ways.  However, the level of popular 
dissatisfaction with the current system is high, just as 
fears are widespread among experts that costs are out of 
control.  Th is project has sought the guidance of ex-
perts and practitioners in California to address people’s 
perceived needs in a higher-quality, more-aff ordable 
system.
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CalPERS
Th is review is based on an interview with CalPERS staff  
on April 13, 2009, and on information provided by per-
sonnel of the Health Benefi ts Branch, Offi  ce of Health 
Plan Administration.  We gratefully acknowledge their 
kind and capable assistance, and accept responsibility 
for any errors of fact or interpretation.  
Introduction.  CalPERS runs a large exchange that 
manages (brokers) health benefi ts for  nearly 1.3 million 
state employees, dependents and retirees, and also for 
employees, retirees and dependents of more than 1000 
local Public Agencies (PAs).  From the point of view of the 
CED’s interest in public policy, CalPERS Health Benefi ts 
Program is the closest living approximation to, or model 
for, the large Regional Exchanges recommended by CED 
as the foundation for market-based universal health 
insurance.  Th rough CalPERS, eligible employees can 
choose from among three HMOs and three statewide 
PPOs, as well as three employee association plans 
specifi cally for Highway Patrol personnel, prison guards, 
and peace offi  cers.  In 2009, about 82,000 people get 
their coverage through these employee association 
plans. In what follows, we treat this population as a 
separate market.  In times past, such as in the late 1980s, 
CalPERS off ered more than 20 diff erent plans.  In fact, 
this exchange contributed greatly to the development 
of the California health-care economy by off ering new 
plans access to a large market with the signing of a single 
contract. Th e number of HMOs diminished over the 
years by a Darwinian process. But Blue Shield Access 
Plus, a network HMO, off ers the services of generally 
the same non-Permanente physician groups as those 
that contracted with the other HMOs serving CalPERS 
members. 
Employer Contributions.  In this model, it is the 
employers (state and local government agencies) that 
determine the contributions made to employee health 
care, as a part of their respective labor-management 
relationships.  In the case of the state, each bargaining 
unit has its own contribution.  However, these are all in 
fi xed dollar amounts that, for the most part, fall below 
the lowest prices in PERS, so it can be said that State 
employees are fully cost conscious in their choices.  
(It was not always this way. Back in the 1970s, the State 
contributed 100% of the average premium for the 
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employee and 90% of the average for dependents.  Th is 
was, of course, infl ationary, because plans charging less 
than the average were “leaving money on the table” or 
getting no marketplace reward for charging less than 
average.  If every employer did that, the pressures for 
every plan to raise its premiums to the average would 
be strong, thus raising the average, and an unending 
infl ationary spiral would ensue.)  Around 1990-91, in the 
context of a recession and budgetary crisis, Governor 
Wilson agreed to some tax increases to help balance the 
budget in exchange for abolition of automatic spending 
increase formulas, including this one.  Employer 
contributions were turned into fi xed dollar amounts, 
independent of the actual prices of health plans.  In the 
early 1990s, premium growth decreased sharply, as did 
some actual premiums, because of the introduction 
of and competition among managed care plans, and 
some of the state employee contributions were above 
the actual prices.  But in the later 1990s, as premiums 
economy-wide began to rise, the premiums of the 
state’s plans rose above the contribution amounts.  Th e 
contribution amounts became an object of collective 
bargaining, but have generally increased no faster than 
the premiums, retaining cost-conscious choice for all 
employees.  Th e PAs are diff erent, however.  Th ere are no 
reliable data, but the PAs are free to negotiate employer 
contributions with their unions, and apparently many 
of them have agreed to contribution formulae in which 
the employer contributes more on behalf of more costly 
plans, such as 80-100 percent of the premium of the plan 
of the employee’s choice, thus weakening or depriving 
the employees of the incentive to make an economical 
choice, and weakening the incentive of plans to off er low 
premiums.
THE PLANS OFFERED.  Th e plans off ered to the general 
employee population in 2009 are as follows:
Blue Shield Access + HMO off ers typical comprehensive 
HMO benefi ts, with no deductibles and $15 copayments 
for offi  ce visits, for the services of some 200+ physician 
organizations generally contracting on the basis of per 
capita prepayment for professional services (but usually 
not institutional services and pharmacy).  Th e monthly 
premium for a single adult is about $392 in Los Angeles, 
the most populous county.  (For prices in other areas, 
see the discussion of regional pricing below.)  Th is plan 
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serves residents of 35 of California’s 58 counties, gener-
ally not including thinly populated rural counties.  (All 
the prices can be found on the website www.calpers.
ca.gov.)  Blue Shield shares some risk with PERS.
Blue Shield Net Value HMO is a fairly recent innova-
tion, requested by CalPERS, in which Blue Shield off ers a 
subset of its Access + network, chosen for superior value 
for money, serving residents of 17 counties not including 
such relatively costly areas as San Francisco, San Mateo, 
Santa Clara and Santa Cruz counties in the North.  Th e 
monthly premium for a single adult in Los Angeles is 
about $352.  Th e deductibles and copayments are the 
same as Blue Shield Access+.
Kaiser Permanente HMO, the largest fully integrated 
prepaid group practice, is off ered with the same cost-
sharing provisions as the other HMOs, in 31 counties, 
generally excluding the most rural thinly populated 
areas.  Its monthly premium in Los Angeles is about $359 
for a single individual. Kaiser Permanente is fully at risk 
for all services. 
Th ree self-funded PPOs – PERS Care, PERS Choice, 
and PERS Select – are all administered by Anthem Blue 
Cross, which pays providers the fees it can negotiate 
in the private market.  Th e three plans off er similar 
deductibles, such as $500 per year for an individual, 
$1000 per year for a family, $3000 out of pocket 
maximum for an individual and $6000 for a family.  
(Th e PERS Care maximums are $2000 and $4000.)  PERS 
Care and PERS Choice are off ered in every county.  
PERS Select is not off ered in four mainly high-cost 
Northern California counties.  Some people stay with 
PERS Care despite its considerably higher cost, because 
of attachment to providers who are not in the more 
selective networks, or because of preference for its 
somewhat more generous coverage.  
HISTORY OF THE PPOs.  Th e history is interesting.  Back 
in the 1970s and before, indemnity insurance was off ered 
by a private insurance company, CalWest Occidental.  
With the growth of HMOs in the urban areas, CalWest 
went into a “death spiral” and left the market.  CalPERS 
did not then, and still does not, practice “risk equaliza-
tion,” a practice in which all plans are presented to the 
market on a risk-neutral basis so that risk selection is 
taken out of the competition.  (Th e new Dutch model of 
universal health insurance based on competition in the 
private sector does use risk equalization.)  Moreover, 
operating in many rural counties with provider mo-
nopolies, it was and is diffi  cult for an insurer to operate 
with providers who are unwilling to negotiate prices and 
accept utilization management.  But CalPERS must off er 
insurance to employees everywhere in the state; that is a 
given.  So CalPERS decided to create and off er their own 
self-funded fee-for-service PPO to be available every-
where.  By self-funding, they could keep close control of 
the benefi t design and not have to rely on insured plans 
with more state insurance regulation.  However, PERS 
needs to charge premiums that would allow its PPO to 
break even over the cycle.  Th at is, this plan does not have 
an open-ended call on the State General Fund.  PERS 
Care has gradually gone into a death spiral.  Its single 
premium in Los Angeles is now about $698 per month.  
So, wishing to preserve the same covered benefi ts but 
with a less costly plan, PERS created a second self-fund-
ed PPO, PERS Choice, focused on a narrower network 
of more effi  cient providers.  Its monthly premium for a 
single adult in Los Angeles is about $459.  Th is was still 
undesirably high.  And PERS stood up to and fought the 
high prices charged by the Sutter system of non-profi t 
hospitals that enjoys considerable market power in 
Northern California.46  So PERS has recently introduced a 
still more selective network of high-value providers, PERS 
Select, which does not include Sutter and other high-cost 
providers.  Its single premium in Los Angeles is about 
$435 a month.  It is off ered in all but four counties.
A Government Insurance Company?  Th ese CalPERS 
PPOs have attracted some attention in the context of 
the discussion of national health reform, and whether 
there should be a government insurance company.  
Single-payer advocates, failing to achieve their actual 
goal, appear to be very enthusiastic about a government 
chartered and run insurance company “to compete 
with the private companies and make them charge 
less.”  Others are wary that this government insurance 
company could charge Medicare’s administered prices 
(which are generally signifi cantly below prices paid in 
the private market), shift costs to the private companies 
(as Medicare does now), and thereby accomplish the 
46 Bleys W. Rose, “CalPERS Shuns Sutter Hospitals,” op.cit.
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ultimate goal of the single-payer advocates: to drive the 
private companies out of business.  And, if that did not do 
the job, the government could tilt the playing fi eld further 
by subsidizing the government insurance company, 
and/or by regulation.  Are the CalPERS PPOs such a 
government insurance company?  Probably not.  For one 
thing, the CalPERS PPOs rely on a private company to 
administer them, and Blue Cross pays that company’s 
commercial prices.  For another, the PERS plans were 
invented to solve a particular problem in the market, 
i.e., the need for a wide access PPO to be available in all 
parts of the State.  Th ey take on a more diffi  cult task that, 
apparently, private companies are unable or unwilling 
to perform.  Th ey were not invented to compete with the 
private sector across the board.  (If they were, their 28 
percent market share of the non-employee association 
market would not suggest much success.)  And fi nally, 
with its chronic and apparently incurable budget 
defi cits, the state of California does not appear to be in 
a position to fund any defi cits.  And, unlike the federal 
government, the state cannot just print money.  If people 
are concerned that private companies may not cover all 
of the geography of the country, however, it could make 
sense for the regional exchange to fi ll the gap with a self-
funded but unsubsidized (that is, required to break even) 
private-company-administered PPO.
Market Shares.  Of the 1,285,983 total covered lives, 
about 86,430 are in the Association Plans.  Of the remain-
ing 1.2 million, the market shares are as follows:
Plan Market Share (Percent)
Blue Shield Access + 24
Blue Shield Net Value 9
Kaiser Permanente 39
PERS Care 6
PERS Choice 21
PERS Select 1
Recall that Blue Shield Net Value and PERS Select are 
fairly recent entrants, so these market shares may not 
refl ect their long-run equilibrium levels.  In any case, 
the HMO market share in this population is 72 percent, 
despite the fact that about 500,000 lives come from the 
PAs whose employees have less incentive to be cost con-
scious than state employees. 
Regional Pricing.  Twenty years ago, perhaps less, the 
prices charged the members were uniform across the 
State.  Th en cost trends in the diff erent regions diverged 
increasingly.  PAs that were in PERS and in particular 
regions of the state began to notice that they could get 
signifi cantly lower rates locally, outside PERS.  Some left 
PERS.  Th e attrition became signifi cant.  Th e PERS Board 
tried various measures to make it more diffi  cult or less 
attractive for PAs to withdraw from PERS and go on their 
own.  Now, by contractual agreement, participating plans 
in PERS cannot undercut PERS prices to attract PAs to 
leave PERS.  But the main response was to bow to eco-
nomic reality and to introduce separate prices by distinct 
regions to refl ect local market conditions.  Th e following 
are the regions for pricing purposes, and for illustration, 
the Blue Shield Access + single monthly premiums in 
each:
Region Blue Shield Access + Monthly Premium
SF Bay Area/Sacramento $533
Los Angeles Area $392
Other Southern California $448
Other Northern California $541
Innovative Use Of Size And A Market Of Cost Con-
scious Customers To Develop Economical Alterna-
tives.  It was observed above that historically, CalPERS 
eased the market entry of many new HMOs in California 
by off ering them one standard contract that would let 
them reach 1.3 million potential members.  Th is was 
far less costly than entering the employer-based market 
otherwise, where plans would need to seek entry into 
thousands of employment groups, each of which would 
require its own non-standard benefi ts package, its own 
sales eff orts, underwriting, employee materials, etc., all 
perhaps to be able to enroll a few hundred members 
at best from each employer.  From the point of view of 
developing a competitive market, the employer-based 
system is usually a huge barrier.  CalPERS is a much more 
promising model, indeed a real “market opener.” 
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But in recent years, possibly under pressure from State 
employees on fi xed-dollar contributions, CalPERS has 
gone even further, and taken the initiative and advan-
tage of its size to demand actively the development of 
new competitors within its system.  No single employer 
would be able to initiate such market innovation, nor has 
the Pacifi c Business Group on Health had such success.  
One such new plan was the development of PERS Select, 
a narrower network of more economical providers that 
could be off ered for a 3 percent lower premium than 
PERS Choice.  Th e next was Blue Shield Net Value HMO, 
again a narrower network of more economical providers, 
that could be off ered for 10 percent less than Blue Shield 
Access +.  Each of these begins to off er some marketplace 
reward to providers for being more economical, some-
thing that is generally lacking in America’s health care 
system. 
Th e newest, and by far the most ground-breaking initia-
tive, is a new pilot project for the Sacramento market 
among Blue Shield of CA (BSC), Hill Physicians Group 
(Hill), a large IPA, and Catholic Healthcare West (CHW), 
a large nonprofi t hospital organization.  Th e provider 
partners have committed to a new joint project in which 
they are at risk to hold fl at or reduce costs for their enroll-
ment of the 220,000 CalPERS members who choose to 
enroll in Blue Shield Net Value in a three-county area 
(Sacramento, Placer and El Dorado counties) through 
better, more-coordinated care.  Th is project addresses 
the problem that even in the typical “carrier HMO,” 
incentives of doctors and hospitals are not aligned the 
way they are in a center-based HMO such as Kaiser 
Permanente.  Th ere are many things that doctors can do 
to keep people from needing hospital admission.  Typi-
cally, hospitals’ incentives are to keep their beds fi lled, 
and they have little incentive to work with the doctors on 
such initiatives.  Th e possibilities for collaborative ef-
forts include choice of medical devices, joint discharge 
planning, disease management, palliative care, end of 
life care, chronic complex case management, manage-
ment of Acute Coronary Syndrome patients, and more.  
As one example, inpatient readmissions within 30 days 
have received a great deal of attention lately.  It is a major 
problem for Medicare.  Mitigating this problem requires 
the collaborative eff orts of doctors and hospitals.  Medi-
care does not reimburse doctors adequately for extra 
eff orts to keep people from returning to the hospital.47  In 
this model, the doctors will be rewarded for their eff orts 
in preventing the need for readmissions.  To facilitate 
achievement of this goal, CalPERS will establish a new 
pricing region for public agencies within Sacramento, 
Placer and El Dorado counties. Th is will sharpen compe-
tition in the three-county area and increase the ability of 
this pilot to gain market share by focusing price competi-
tion on its service area.  
Th is has not happened, and would be most unlikely to 
happen, in the traditional employer market – because 
no single employer or even coalition of employers could 
off er insurers a market of price-conscious employees 
large enough to enable the pilot to achieve economies of 
scale and to pay for itself.  In fact, other value networks by 
other carriers have not done well in the employer market 
because employers generally want one or a very few 
plans to satisfy most employees and are not interested in 
narrow networks.
Th is is highly provocative in relation to the CED proposal, 
because the regional exchanges proposed by CED would 
be able to undertake similar initiatives.  It also helps 
explain why regional exchanges, as opposed to a single 
national market like the FEHBP, are important.  Regional 
strategies based on local market conditions can innovate 
in ways that a national exchange could not.  Also, this 
pilot is important from a national point of view, because 
it is almost the only initiative, outside of the large multi-
specialty group practices that have their own affi  liated 
hospitals, that off ers to align incentives of doctors and 
hospitals.
From a broader effi  ciency standpoint, it is noteworthy 
that CalPERS has been able to innovate in plan 
design within geographic sub-areas of its jurisdiction, 
while continuing to capture economies of scale 
in administration and organization over its entire 
jurisdiction.  For example, it can process paperwork 
for all of the state’s employees, and it can off er insurers 
47 Reed Ableson, “Hospitals Pay for Cutting Costly Readmis-
sions,” New York Times, May 9, 2009, p. B1, http://www.
nytimes.com/2009/05/09/business/09relapse.html?_
r=1&sq=reed abelson may 9 2009&st=cse&scp=1&pagewa
nted=print.
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the economy of contracting state-wide, while creating 
a high-value network in only part of the state.  Th is 
advantage suggests that the design of an exchange 
system for a national health reform should pursue such 
opportunities, in the interest of both innovation and 
administrative savings.
Risk Equalization.  CalPERS does not now do risk equal-
ization of premiums.  Th ey do have the DxCG technology 
which enables them to do risk assessment, i.e. to look at 
what is going on in terms of risks enrolling in the diff er-
ent plans.  Th ey are using that technology now.  Th ey use 
Mercer, which is capable of such analysis.  Th e purpose 
of risk equalization is to focus competition more sharply 
on cost and quality, by eliminating risk selection as a tool 
that plans can use to earn profi ts.  If CalPERS were to use 
risk equalization, that might have a large impact on the 
rest of the State.  And it might mitigate the death spiral 
that is driving PERS Care out of the market.  
Western Health Advantage.  Last year, CalPERS dropped 
Western Health Advantage even though it was the low-
est priced HMO in their portfolio.  Reasons included 
that WHA was getting favorable risk selection, it was not 
planning to expand, and it was not doing enough disease 
management.  However, the WHA providers are repre-
sented in BSC Net Value.  If it works, the BSC HILL CHW 
pilot could replace WHA as the lowest-priced HMO in 
the system, and should have considerable potential for 
expansion, because Hill and CHW have a much larger 
reach than just the three county area.  In fact, the BSC 
HILL CHW pilot has statewide and national signifi cance 
because, perhaps for the fi rst time, it integrates traditional 
non-profi t community hospitals with traditional fee-for-
service solo practice doctors, and aligns their incentives.  
It could serve as a model to create Accountable Care 
Organizations, a concept gaining increasing attention 
nationally.  Such integration is a signifi cant contributor to 
the superior effi  ciency of Kaiser Permanente.
Catholic Healthcare West
Th e following is based on a September 3, 2009 interview 
with personnel at Catholic Healthcare West.
Generally speaking, the thinking and views of CHW are 
very similar to the views and conclusions of CED.  Both 
organizations believe that health care costs too much 
now, there is a great deal of waste, and improved access 
to care is very important but would not be sustainable 
without serious cost savings that require delivery system 
change.  As the written materials of both organizations 
state, delivery system change means integration and 
incentives alignment so that all participants are rewarded 
for providing high-quality aff ordable care. 
Th e enacted national health reform bill refers to moving 
to payment by episodes, accountable care organizations, 
bundled payments, reducing unnecessary readmissions, 
quality incentives, and changing from fee-for-service 
delivery.  But these ideas are pilot projects, not policy 
changes that would drive actual fundamental change.  
Congress is focusing on access now, as if in the fear that 
the nation will never get there if not now.  But delivery 
system change is essential to achieve the savings that are 
needed to pay for and sustain that broadened access.
A key issue and barrier to effi  ciency through integration 
of services in California is the prohibition against the 
corporate practice of medicine, something established by 
the medical profession to block competition by orga-
nized systems.  If this were changed or circumvented, 
CHW could at least in theory hire physicians for such 
purposes as primary care in underserved areas, hos-
pitalists, and other services requiring physicians.  Th e 
CMA strongly opposes the corporate practice of medi-
cine.  (Apparently other states do not ban the corporate 
practice of medicine.)  Th is policy should be changed, if 
necessary through a federal override.  Similarly, the new 
reform law creates only a pilot program for bundled pay-
ments.  (Although such reform is very much in the spirit 
of CED’s policy recommendations, it was not explicitly 
discussed in the CED statement.)
Regarding the AHA’s agreement with the White House 
in the national health reform debate to off er Medicare 
savings of $155 billion over 10 years, with fi ve years 
to adjust with Market Basket minus 1 percent annual 
update, CHW recognizes that there is a lot of ineffi  ciency 
in the system now, a function of incentives, from which 
such savings could be achieved.  CHW intends to manage 
to that target.  However, beyond this “conceptual” 
statement, there were no specifi cs, and this does not 
amount to a large volume discount when one considers 
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the additional $175 billion of revenue that would result 
from universal coverage.
CHW reported that achievement of the CHW/Hill/Blue 
Shield/PERS Sacramento pilot project (discussed in 
detail in the report on the interview with PERS offi  cials) 
was not easy.  Th e CHA opposed it.  What are the pros-
pects for success?  “We’ll see. Th e devil is in the details.”  
It is structured so that it is in the doctors’ interest to save 
on hospital costs.  It will be a “virtual ACO.”  It will be a 
model that is more nimble and fl exible than Kaiser Per-
manente with the latter’s large fi xed costs.  Recognizing 
that some 85 percent of health care is in fee-for-service 
solo practice in community hospitals, this is a prototype 
that could transform the largest segment of the delivery 
system and give traditional providers a vehicle for par-
ticipating in fundamental restructuring of the delivery 
system.
CHW/Hill is an example of what CHW would like to do.  
CHW offi  cials fundamentally believe that integration and 
effi  ciency enhancement are essential to their mission.  
Th ey are not fi ghting for the status quo.  Th ey want to 
innovate.  But the Sacramento pilot is a fi rst, and no one 
knows whether it will work.  Th ey take a cautious stance.
Th e immediate goal of CHW is to make the Sacramento 
pilot work.  If it does, they would want to expand it.  
But to do so, there would have to be market conditions 
similar to what PERS has created in Sacramento, includ-
ing consumers with choices and the opportunity to save 
money by choosing a less costly health plan.  Th e Sac-
ramento area is a “system-based market” with Kaiser 
Permanent, UC Davis, and Sutter (which has affi  liated 
medical groups).  It would be hard to rival Kaiser Perma-
nent because Kaiser’s structure gives it built-in advan-
tages of incentives alignment.
Th e Service Employees International Union agrees with 
and supports the pilot.  Th ey are very interested.  Th ey 
understand the implications for members (wage pres-
sures and possible job losses), but their members have 
an interest in lower health-care costs.  SEIU wants to be 
in the front of the movement to lower costs.  All of the 
CHW-SEIU contracts have retraining clauses, so there 
would be retraining as the nature of the work changes.  
CHW’s dialogue with Andy Stern of the SEIU has pro-
duced a diff erent labor-management arrangement with 
recognition that workplace rules would need to change 
to lower costs.
What about CHW as employer?  Th ey off er employees 
multiple health plan options and a fi xed dollar payment 
so that the employee can save money by choosing the 
low priced plan.  Th ey are not self-insured.  Also, like 
Safeway, they off er tools and ideas for healthier lives.  
CHW has 53,000 employees and spends $380 million a 
year on employee health care.  Th ey do off er a CHW PPO 
with incentives to use their facilities.  Th ey off er depen-
dent care for all employees.  Th eir belief that everyone 
should have access to health care has trumped concerns 
about same-sex partners’ lifestyles, so they cover them.
How would CHW adapt to the CED model?  (Th ey report-
ed to the CED by a separate channel that they were 
acquainted with CED and its work.)  Th is is just the mod-
el they would like to see.  We also discussed the similar 
Wyden-Bennett bill that was introduced in the Congress, 
and they said they thought that it was a great idea and 
expressed regret and surprise that it “didn’t have legs.”
Cisco Systems
Th is interview was held on September 8, 2009, with 
health-care personnel at Cisco Systems.  Cisco personnel 
reported familiarity with the managed competition 
model and had read some of Alain Enthoven’s writings 
about it.
Cisco’s own model of employee health care, however, 
is quite diff erent.  Cisco is mostly self-insured with 90% 
of employees in the self-insured plans, while 10% are in 
HMOs (KP in Northern California and Harvard Pilgrim in 
Massachusetts). Other than the HMOs, they off er a PPO 
and an EPO, the latter using the CIGNA and United net-
works. Th ey have just introduced a high-deductible plan.
Like much of the high-tech industry, Cisco is “very 
paternalistic” with rich health-care benefi ts (but 
not much in the way of retirement benefi ts, with the 
expectation that employee profi t sharing or stock 
options will build personal wealth).  Th ey are moving to 
more employee cost sharing in health care.  For 2009, 
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the PPO and EPO both have coinsurance for out-of-
network services, 100 percent coverage in network, 
with copayments of $10 and $15 per visit.  Th e PPO has 
a $250 deductible, the EPO $100.  Both have a $1000 
out of pocket maximum.  Also, they off er up to $300 
in bonuses for participation in health incentives and 
improvement programs.  For 2010, they will introduce 
90/10 coinsurance in network, raise the deductible to 
$400/800 for employee and family, and make the PPO 
and EPO similar.  Later, the interview revealed that Cisco 
is actually eliminating the EPO because it is not very 
effi  cient.  Th ey took the gatekeepers out of the system.  
Th ey are also moving to a more robust health incentive 
account, $800 for fi tness, disease management, health 
appraisal, and so on. Th ey are trying to have employees 
and families think about healthy lifestyles and disease 
prevention.
Cisco personnel did not discuss whether the company 
engaged in self insurance to escape benefi t mandates 
under insurance regulation.
Cisco does not do “strict Managed Competition.”  Th e 
HMO costs the company much less than the PPO or EPO 
and the employees pay less, but they do not get to keep 
the full savings.  In the course of its upcoming program 
changes, Cisco will not pass on the full diff erence, but 
they will move closer to that.
What are Cisco’s thoughts about the problem of costs 
continuing to rise?  Th eir average employee age is 39-40.  
Th ey hope to stave off  chronic conditions by engaging 
employees in healthy lifestyle activities.  In November 
2008, they opened a large onsite health center in San 
Jose, which is available to families of employees.  It is 
staff ed by four family practitioners, two internists, a 
chiropractor, a physical therapist, and a pharmacy, with 
behavioral health and full service primary care.  Cisco is 
also developing a referral network with negotiated prices. 
Th ey get better drug prices for their center than their PPO 
gets.  One half of their U.S. employee population is in San 
Jose.  Th e center is now only nine months old, and so it is 
too soon to tell what impact it will have on costs.
Cisco’s corporate goal for health care is to be a bit richer 
than the competition, as it is one of the diff erentiators, 
and they want their people to be proactive and partici-
pate in prevention activities.  High users should have to 
pay more, so they are raising their out-of-pocket maxi-
mum to $2000.
Can employers “bend the curve?”  Not alone.  Cisco 
believes that they need to work with the health plans and 
look for effi  ciencies.  Th ey need to get patients to be more 
involved in their health.  Th ey need behavioral therapies.  
But there is nothing radically new or diff erent in their 
practices thus far.
What would CISCO think about an employer mandate?  
Cisco is going to cover its own employees regardless.  
Still, an employer mandate is not a bad idea, but there 
needs to be a balance between what large employers can 
provide and what small employers can aff ord.
What would Cisco think about a tax cap?  Cisco likes to 
use health care generously to minimize health-related 
absenteeism or disability.  It is worth a lot to keep healthy 
employees on the job.  Cisco does not believe that the 
nation should cap the benefi t.  Cisco personnel include 
a member of the American College of Occupational 
Medicine and they are cognizant of the costs of disability. 
Cisco wants the costs of absence factored into decisions.  
Employers are willing to pay more for total effi  ciency 
including the costs of work loss.  Cisco partners with 
Kaiser on IT, but they are concerned about ineffi  ciencies 
from delays.  Kaiser members get prompt access to 
primary care, but if someone needs an MRI, there is likely 
to be a two week wait.  Th e Palo Alto Medical Foundation 
is a lot more expensive for CISCO, but it is easier there for 
the patient to be seen.
Integrated delivery systems are not a large part of Cisco’s 
thinking, mainly on this issue of delay.  Employees come 
back to Cisco, and Cisco has to intervene to get them 
health care. 
Cisco does not have a position on national health reform. 
Cisco personnel expressed a view that Cisco would like to 
stay in the employee health insurance business, to keep 
employees healthy and productive.  Still, the sentiment 
was that, in the long run, employer-based health insur-
ance is not sustainable.
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What about Wyden-Bennett or the CED vision of 
“beyond employer-based health insurance?”  Cisco 
thinks of health insurance as a diff erentiator and would 
like to stay with it.  General Motors has a huge retiree 
burden, so it is understandable how GM would like 
to get out.  But most companies do not.  Still, Cisco 
personnel could imagine the day when employers 
agreed on a common standard plan design for the sake of 
simplifi cation and cost savings from standardization.
Genentech
Alain Enthoven met with employee benefi ts personnel at 
Genentech, on May 5, 2009.  Opinions were expressed as 
personal rather than as offi  cial Genentech views.
Genentech, as a health-care provider, would not seem to 
have a compelling reason to lead America in health-cost 
containment.  Th ey are focused on advanced bio tech 
products.
Th e most important idea guiding Genentech’s policies 
is that they have earned and received ratings in national 
publications as one of the best places to work, or “an 
employer of choice,” and that they work hard and system-
atically to keep that rating. “We work to make the benefi t 
package compelling,” so that employees do not have 
to spend time over it.  Th ey cover very broad benefi ts, 
including unusual procedures if desired.  Th ey bench-
mark with Amgen, Genzyme, Merck, and Pfi zer, the 
large pharma companies.  Now that it is a part of Roche, 
Genentech itself is a large Pharma company.  Th e com-
pany’s job is to help “win the war for talent.”  All of those 
companies have very generous health benefi ts, partly for 
the war to win talent, and partly because they are part of 
health care.
Genentech off ers Aetna PPOs and Kaiser Permanente.  
About 10 percent of employees choose Kaiser.  Five per-
cent waive coverage.  Th ey have a cafeteria plan which 
includes more credits for lower-paid employees.  Th e 
company pays 90 percent of the cost of whatever plan 
the employee chooses.  Th ey are self insured.  Th ey have 
$5 copayments.  Th ey do not off er Consumer Directed/
Health Savings Account plans because very few would 
choose them if they could.
On questions about public policy:
On an employer mandate, they meet it by most defi ni-
tions. Th ey cover anything that anyone can think of, so 
mandated benefi ts would not be an issue for them.
On the tax cap, they do gross up pay for some employee 
expenses, so they would be likely to go on doing what 
they are doing, possibly grossing up pay to compensate 
for tax losses.  If the tax break was taken away, the ex-
pectation is that large employers would fi gure out how 
to provide health insurance, customizing their program 
to meet their requirements.  If the government covered 
some benefi ts, they would probably provide a wrap-
around. 
What should government do?  Cover the uninsured and 
cover preventive services.
Whatever the question on public policy, Genentech 
would be determined to keep winning the war for talent.  
One thing they are looking at now is an on-site medical 
clinic.  Th ey are doing a feasibility study.  Google has a 
clinic for convenience.  Roche has one in its U.S. head-
quarters (likely to move to San Francisco).  As explained 
in the previous interview, Cisco has an onsite clinic as 
part of their Life Connections Health Center which also 
includes a fi tness center and child care.  Genentech has 
considered these examples as it makes its choices about 
its own on-site clinic.
Intel
Alain Enthoven met with health benefi ts personnel for 
Intel on May 19, 2009.
Intel is primarily a self-insured employer with 87 percent 
of employees in their self-insured plans. (Th e other 13 
percent are in Kaiser or GHC.)
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Th ey prefer the self-insured approach for several reasons:
 • Th ey like to be able to control their own plan 
design.  Federal regulation now constrains self-
insured plans with respect to Mental Health and 
Substance Abuse, but at least that is uniform 
across the United States.
 • Administration is easier that way because they are 
the same in every location.  Intel’s employees are 
mobile, and diff erent benefi ts in diff erent loca-
tions would cause complexity.
 • State mandates add cost and complexity.
 • State mandates add cost which can add up when 
there are many such mandates, even if each one 
adds only 1 percent to the cost.
 • Employees can be made to understand that 
health expenditures are out of the company’s 
money, not an insurance company’s.  Th e whole 
complex matter of experience rating is not a part 
of most employees’ thinking.  Intel wants the em-
ployees to know that the real payer is Intel.  Intel 
devotes a lot of eff ort to education about costs, 
wellness, and the employer’s cost.
Intel off ers several choices including a high-deductible 
plan that is free to the employee (with a $1200 individual 
deductible, $2400 for a family, and a $4200 annual out of 
pocket maximum).  Th ey have eight tiers of coverage (in-
cluding tiers for employee only, employee plus spouse, 
and plus one, two or three or more children).  Th ey also 
have a fi rst-dollar, $20 copayment plan, for which the 
additional premium can be as high as $6000 per year 
in the most expensive tier.  Th ey do have some HMOs, 
though that does not appear to be a signifi cant part of 
their thinking.  Th ey have a coinsurance plan with a 
$250/500 deductible that pays 90 percent in network and 
70 percent out of network. Th ey also have a “legacy” plan, 
a CDHP with HRA model which they no longer 
off er to new employees.  Altogether they have seven 
plans to choose from, managed by two networks (An-
them and Cigna).  Th ey pay for the low-priced plan and 
the employee pays the rest.   Th e market share of the 
coinsurance plan has fallen from 60 percent to 34 percent 
as people fi gured out that it is tax-advantageous to take 
the higher deductible and fund their own HSAs.
Intel is trying to get the employees to be conscious of 
total cost, as noted above.  Th eir strategy on total costs is:
 • Th e right level of coverage for each employee 
including protection against catastrophe;
 • Employee engagement;
 • Health and wellness, including a health-risk 
appraisal and a free once-a-year wellness 
checkup;
 • Management of chronic conditions; and
 • Engagement with providers: conversations with 
doctors, report cards for doctors, annual reviews, 
and an executive review meeting.
Costs are rising too fast.  Intel does not believe that it 
knows the right solution.  Th ere appears to be a gulf 
between the CED economists’ way of thinking which 
includes markets, incentives, and delivery systems, and 
the Intel view which is still rooted more in the tradi-
tional model.  As to who are addressing cost and qual-
ity, Intel cites Minnesota broadly, General Mills and 
General Electric, who are innovating in payment models 
(Prometheus), coalitions who are trying to change pay-
ment.  Intel participates in the Pacifi c Business Group on 
Health.
On the CED approach and Wyden-Bennett, the reaction 
was, “Why do we believe we need to take employers out 
of the picture?”  Enthoven explained the main problem:  
No choices of systems, and the employer model as a bar-
rier to entry for innovative health plans.  Another Intel 
concern was “too many choices.”  Enthoven did relate 
that Stanford employees seemed to fi nd six choices bur-
densome.  Th e discussion led to plan-chooser software as 
potentially a good way to narrow the fi eld.
Intel supports accountability in care delivery, but the 
discussion did not reveal concrete mechanisms to 
accomplish that objective.
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Intel operates in 12 countries and in most of them they 
off er a supplemental plan in addition to the national 
plan. 
Employees choosing HMOs pay lower premiums than 
they do for the coinsurance plan. Th eir prices are very 
competitive.  “We are an anomaly,” as most of Intel’s peer 
companies have larger market penetration by HMOs.
Intel personnel visited the Kaiser Permanente innovation 
center and thought it was phenomenal and that there 
was a lot to learn from their system.  But people come 
with pro- and anti-HMO prejudices, and Intel personnel 
personally were negative about HMOs. 
On public policies, there was a fear that an employer 
mandate could cause Intel to be stuck with federal stan-
dards that would not fi t them, such as a proposal that 
there be no lifetime maximum.  Pay or Play could be very 
costly if the law is that an employer must pay 8 percent 
of payroll.  Th at means no reward for good cost manage-
ment.  Who knows that 8 percent is right?  At some point, 
employers would decide to just “pay,” but Intel does not 
want to walk away from employee health.  Intel employ-
ees in San Francisco are well covered in Intel’s view, but 
what they have does not satisfy the new city mandate, 
presumably because the employees all have chosen the 
high-deductible plan. 
Th e conversation with Intel was a striking indication 
that reasonable, informed people can see the whole 
world of health care quite diff erently.  Intel personnel are 
acquainted with Hill Physicians and with Kaiser.  Follow-
ups to the formal interview included the description of 
the Blue Shield/Hill/CHW pilot, and discussions of how 
incentives were needed to support disease management 
infrastructure to facilitate doctors working to keep hospi-
tal discharges from being readmitted.
Nektar Therapeutics
Alain Enthoven interviewed human resources personnel 
at Nektar Th erapeutics on March 11, 2009.
Th e main message was that in biotech, health benefi ts 
are considered to be very important because they are in 
the health-care business, and employees are likely to be 
particularly health-conscious or aware of the high costs 
of medical care.   Employees want choices.  And to attract 
highly educated and skilled employees, biotech compa-
nies want to be seen as generous in health benefi ts.
Nektar off ers employees a choice that includes Anthem 
Blue Cross (HMO and PPO) and Kaiser Permanente.  Th e 
employee pays 10 percent of the premium for the HMOs 
and 15 pecent of the premium for the PPO.  Market 
shares are:
Plan Market Share (Percent)
Kaiser 21
Blue Cross HMO 31
Blue Cross PPO 43
Five percent opt out, probably relying on the spouse’s 
employer.
So a substantial percent (52 percent) do choose HMOs, 
even without getting the full savings from doing so.  
Younger people are more likely to choose an HMO while 
older people are more likely to choose the PPO.  Th e 
older employees have more health issues and more pay.
Nektar does not do cafeteria benefi ts (meaning a fi xed 
dollar budget).  Th e Nektar human resources personnel 
had prior experience in other high tech fi rms (comput-
ers, electronics etc.) where cafeteria benefi ts were more 
prevalent, before moving to Nektar.
According to Nektar, Genentech is the pace-setter in 
biotech; apparently, more companies in electronic 
high tech follow Hewlett Packard as a model.  Th ese 
companies are seen as the industry leaders in their 
sectors.  Genentech is the poster child for very generous 
benefi ts.  Also, having mainly highly educated and 
skilled people, biotech can aff ord more generous health 
benefi ts.  Th e approximately 250 biotech companies in 
California with about 85,000 employees generally do 
about the same as Nektar.  Th is is a volatile industry with 
low job security.  If a clinical trial fails, the company 
needs to cut back its work force.  People fear the loss 
of jobs.  Th ey are interested in their COBRA rights.  
Companies generally have severance pay and pay the 
health benefi ts for as long as the severance lasts.  (Under 
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the recent stimulus bill, companies pay 65 percent of the 
cost and the government reimburses this through tax 
off sets.)
In the early days, Nektar paid 100 percent of the 
premiums.  Th en they decided to encourage HMOs 
because they cost less.  So now employees pay 10 percent 
of the premium for the HMOs, 15 percent for the PPO.
In biotech, “Health care is our business, so rich health 
benefi ts are the norm.”
Even biotech’s health-specialist workforce is fairly igno-
rant about what health insurance costs.  Th e company 
talks about total compensation, tells employees what 
the company is spending on their health insurance, and 
“people are stunned by that.” 
Right now, Nektar HR personnel see no reason for Nektar 
to do things diff erently from what they are doing.  A 
“consumer directed health plan with an HSA” does not 
look attractive.  It would cost the company the same, 
assuming they funded the HSA.
When asked about the CED proposal for universal mar-
ket-based health insurance, they note that in other coun-
tries with universal health insurance, health benefi ts are 
seen as a key attraction.  In New Zealand, companies 
compete for skilled employees by off ering supplemental 
health insurance, even though employer contributions 
to it are taxable income.  In Germany, anybody who can 
aff ord it buys private health insurance.48  Employers seek-
ing to hire highly educated skilled employees want to 
off er health insurance.  So in their view it is likely, even 
with universal health insurance, that many companies 
like Nektar would want to off er supplemental health 
insurance.49 
48 In Holland, 93% of people buy supplemental insurance at 
their own expense.
49 Th e CED proposal would not prevent companies from 
providing supplemental insurance with after tax dollars. 
University of California
Alain Enthoven interviewed University of California 
offi  cials about their employee/retiree health insurance 
program.  Th e interview took place Th ursday, March 26, 
2009.
In the early 1990s, UC adopted a model of employee 
health care that off ered each employee a multiple choice 
of health plan and a fi xed-dollar employer contribution 
to help them buy it.  Th e contribution was set at the level 
of the lowest-priced plan serving all campuses.  (It was 
not Kaiser Permanente, which was often the low-priced 
plan at the campuses it served, but it did not serve all 
campuses.)  Th e main motivation for instituting this 
competition model was to change a fi xed-percentage-
of-premium contribution to a fi xed-dollar contribution, 
regardless of the plan chosen.
UC has maintained the general outlines of this plan, 
but with a number of modifi cations to adapt to the 
University’s changing environment.  Broadly speaking, 
UC management remains satisfi ed with the managed 
competition idea.  However, they are concerned that the 
low-priced plan’s premiums continue to grow faster than 
employee compensation in general.  Th us, the health-
care share of total compensation continues to grow.  Th e 
trend to higher costs seems inexorable.  With this reser-
vation, UC management is satisfi ed with the competition 
approach and sees no practical alternative.
Th e UC workforce is quite unionized, and the faculty is 
organized and functions, in some respects, like a union.  
So change is not easy and does not happen frequently.
One development of the plan, taken several years ago 
in response to budgetary needs, was to adopt a tiered 
employer contribution depending on salary.  Employer 
contributions range from 72 percent of the low-priced 
plan serving all campuses (Health Net HMO) for the 
highest-paid employees, to 96 percent for the lowest-paid 
($40,000 or less).  Th ese contributions remain fi xed-
dollar amounts.  Employees may pay their shares with 
pre-tax dollars.  Th is structure generally leaves employ-
ees fully cost-conscious in their plan choices.
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Th e plans off ered to active employees now are:
Health Net, a network-model HMO marketing the 
services of many medical groups and IPAs throughout 
the state, contractors paid on a per-capita prepayment 
amount for professional services, in some cases with 
incentives to manage other costs.  Market share 37.6 
percent.  Premium per family per year $15,030.
Kaiser Permanente, a prepaid group-practice model 
HMO which bears full risk for all services and which 
serves many parts of California, but not Santa Barbara or 
Santa Cruz (though in the latter case, some Santa Cruz 
employees make the trip to Kaiser facilities). Market 
share 27.9 percent.  Premium per family per year $13,935.
Western Health Advantage HMO, a small provider-
based non-profi t HMO serving mainly the Sacramento 
area, but with some presence at UC Davis.  Market share 
2.7 percent (but 20.4 percent at the Davis campus, where 
off ered.)  Premium $13,579.
HMOs off er fi rst dollar coverage.
Anthem Blue Cross PPO, with $250/750 individual/
family deductibles, mainly 20 percent coinsurance for 
in-network providers, a tiered formulary, and out-of-
pocket maxima of $3000/9000 for individuals/families 
in network.  Market share 9.4 percent.  Annual family 
premium $15,364.
Anthem Blue Cross PLUS, a point-of-service product 
with an HMO for the fi rst tier, and a PPO for patients who 
want to get covered care outside the HMO.  Market share 
12.1 percent.  Annual family premium $15,495.
Th e combined market share for the whole system for 
HMOs, including Western Health Advantage and the 
point of service plan as an HMO, is 80.3 percent.  Without 
the POS plan, the HMO market share is 68.3 percent.
CIGNA Choice Fund, a high-deductible plan with a 
University-funded HRA of $1000/2000 individual/family 
per year, and deductibles of $1500/3000 for individuals/
families. Eligible preventive care is paid 100 percent 
without a deductible.  It does not cover behavioral health. 
Members pay 20 percent coinsurance in network.  Th e 
out-of-pocket maxima, including the deductibles, are 
$3000/6000 for individual/families.  Market share 1.3 
percent.  Annual Family premium $15,425. 
Th e market share for HMOs has slipped some as their 
cost advantage has diminished over time.  Th is is a trend 
noted more generally in California.  One factor is that the 
200 or so medical groups that serve as HMO providers 
are also PPO providers, and it is expected that they will 
treat both sets of patients the same.  Th e HMO product is 
regulated more tightly by DMHC, with requirements that 
are not placed on PPOs by DOI.  Moreover, the medi-
cal groups have little or no reason, in general, to favor 
HMOs.
Th e University used to off er Pacifi Care HMO as well. 
However, there was disappointment and concern, after 
it was acquired by United HealthCare, of a growing 
national corporate presence with direction coming 
from out of state, and a loss of focus and commitment 
to California.  Pacifi Care and Health Net have similar 
provider networks.  Th e university at one time piloted a 
Defi nity plan, but its market proved to be quite narrow.
Th ere are some campuses whose environs have little pro-
vider competition, and this can be a problem.
Th e University is assisted by Deloitte.  Deloitte “has 
earned their fees” with savings generated by their work.  
Th ey do risk adjustment using the DxCG Drugs model.  
Th ey use a North-South adjuster of 1.2 to refl ect the 
higher costs in the North.  Employees are charged “risk 
neutral” rates and, 12-18 months after each year, there 
is a fi nancial reconciliation to compensate plans for 
unfavorable risk selection.  Plans are less likely to price 
conservatively because they know they will be compen-
sated for bad risks.
Th e University, like Stanford and CalPERS, is a member 
of Pacifi c Business Group on Health.
University management seeks continuing engagement 
with its health plans, and holds “Blue Sky or Horizon“ 
meetings to consider possible developments and be 
informed and engaged on likely changes.
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Wells Fargo Bank
Alain Enthoven interviewed Wells Fargo Bank human 
resources personnel on April 6, 2009.
In California, Wells Fargo still off ers competing alterna-
tives: Kaiser, Health Net, more- and less-rich CDHPs, 
an HSA-eligible high-deductible plan, and still a broad-
access PPO.  Th e PPO costs a lot more.  It is preserved 
by inertia (people reluctant to change, arguably not 
practicing economic rationality).  “Competition at the 
retail level just doesn’t happen.”  Th e attempt at introduc-
ing competition among health plans is not producing 
the expected eff ects.  Th ere is some competition at the 
carrier level, but too little competition.  Th ere are deci-
sions that are not rational from an economic point of 
view based on non-quantifi able factors or qualitative 
perceptions.  Wells Fargo’s experience is not encouraging 
from the point of view of the power of price competition 
– though personnel acknowledged that an important part 
of the problem is that providers face so few employers 
like Wells Fargo and Stanford whose employees are cost-
conscious.
Th e CDHP has produced a little more value, but at the 
lower end of the cost spectrum – for generic drugs and 
the like.  Th e result has been perhaps a 4-6 percent real 
reduction in cost, risk adjusted.  People are making ratio-
nal decisions at the lower end, but not yet asking “who is 
the best doctor,” because there is no information on the 
quality of individual doctors, especially at the specialist 
level.  Medicare does collect information on individual 
doctors, but it is not being made public.  Doctors are 
afraid of transparency.  Th ere is a web site, YELP, that 
lets people comment on anything, including doctors and 
hairdressers.  A doctor in San Francisco brought suit to 
stop it.  
Kaiser appears to shadow-price the other plans, running 
generally about 2 percentage points less expensive than 
Aetna.  (Kaiser Permanente makes its own unilateral 
investment decisions with no transparency to employers, 
so employers do not know the ROI resulting from those 
decisions.)
Health Net has a Value Net, but only in the South.  
Because of Sutter, there is no point in trying it for the 
North.  Th e Pacifi c Business Group on Health tried to 
look into anti-trust action regarding Sutter, but Wells 
Fargo personnel do not know what came of it.  Wells 
Fargo found that the Health Net Value Net costs are no 
lower than their broad network when risk adjusted.  
Health Net and Kaiser Permanente have converged to 
almost the same cost.  Kaiser does a lot of the right things 
in care management, but that doesn’t show up in lower 
dues rates.  Th us, the diff erences between low- and high-
cost groups have narrowed.
What should the government do?  Th e expressed person-
al opinion was to support HIT to use the information for 
quality transparency – though the doctors resist transpar-
ency.  Th e most important potential accomplishment of 
national health “reform” would be having quality-related 
information.  Likewise, the potential great value of 
Health Information Technology would be if it could lead 
to a large increase in quality-related information.  Th en 
people could make evidence-based decisions.  Following 
that, there needs to be payment reform: pay doctors for 
outcomes.  
Th ere should be individual mandates, but what we 
learned in Massachusetts was that the defi nition of the 
meaning of “covered” depends on “weird standards” 
so they have had to tell their well-insured employees 
that they may not be insured in the eyes of the state.  
Also, employers need to be more open about mandates.  
Individual mandates appear to be a good idea, but are 
not aff ordable.
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Provider Market Power
Th e battle between CalPERS and a large and important 
chain of hospitals, described above, yields one of the 
powerful lessons from the experience of California.  It 
is not enough for an insurer or market organizer to seek 
to provide quality, aff ordable health care; that entity 
must have choices from a truly competitive marketplace.  
Competition may come from conventional antitrust 
action, although this path is always complex.  Even if it 
is clear that there is excessive market power, it is almost 
never clear what remedy could prove appropriate.  
A merger or acquisition that would accumulate 
excessive market power can be blocked in a generally 
simple fashion, but excessive existing market power is 
diffi  cult to excise.  Owners of existing fi rms will argue 
that weakening their competitive positions, though 
potentially in the public interest, devalues investments 
that they made in good faith.  In some markets, the 
owners and monopolizers of capital may even be not-
for-profi t entities, which could seem to the non-expert 
electorate to be inappropriate targets of antitrust 
enforcement.
CED advocates optional alternative federal regulation 
of health plans, which would allow effi  cient plans to 
expand across state borders and introduce competition 
where there is market power and an excessive return on 
investment.  Th at competition would drive prices down 
and benefi t consumers.  However, expanding investment 
may not be a sound remedy in markets that already have 
adequate or excessive capacity, even if that capacity is 
controlled by too few owners and thus provides market 
power.
Creative and painstaking antitrust enforcement may well 
be needed in some markets.  New and innovative reme-
dies may be needed.  Th ere will be no textbook, one-size-
fi ts-all answer to the kinds of bottlenecks to competition 
that can occur in complex corners of the medical-care 
marketplace.
Transparency
In an exercise of market power, as noted above, health 
providers can use the complexity of their services to 
conceal true costs from consumers – including even 
Lessons from the California Health-Care System
health-insurance plans.  Th ose providers can demand 
complicated contract terms that prevent consumers and 
insurers from accessing choices and alternatives.  Public 
policy will need to be just as creative to prevent abuses of 
market power through manipulation or withholding of 
information.
Incentives And The Organization Of The Market
A premise of CED’s approach is that providers, insurers 
and consumers can be driven toward responsible be-
havior only if their incentives are aligned.  As explained 
above, we believe that employer-provided insurance 
generally has led to dysfunctional, non-competitive 
markets in health care.  However, in California, several 
major employers – including the state itself – have orga-
nized markets constructively, and improved outcomes 
as a result.  Cost growth in California has been less than 
in other metropolitan states, which is diffi  cult to achieve 
in an increasingly national market for health care.  How-
ever, cost growth in California still is unsustainable, and 
even the diff erentials achieved to date will be diffi  cult to 
maintain over extended periods of time.
For all of the diffi  culty of holding growth below a com-
parable national average, and though most employers in 
California do not organize markets in approximation to 
CED’s ideal, the experience in California is instructive.  
Th e interviews in this project do reveal that employers 
that provide cost-responsible choices to their employees 
are broadly satisfi ed with the results, and have not con-
sidered reverting to more-typical approaches of off ering 
more limited choices with simpler contribution systems 
for their employees.  Th e discussion of these experiences 
helps to explain why the “managed competition” model, 
as it sometimes is called, has been attractive to employ-
ers that have used it.
Still, the experience observed by CED nationwide is that 
fi rms fi nd it hard to change from long-standing practices.  
In general, any change in human-resource policy that 
angers even a small minority of the work force can be 
painful.  In particular instances of collective bargaining, 
change may be conceivable only at infrequent time 
intervals, and may be diffi  cult to achieve even if it 
promises long-term benefi t greater than any short-term 
perceived cost.  Th us, lessons from existing successes 
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in California may provide the strongest arguments in a 
very diffi  cult process of improving health care – certainly 
necessary even if not suffi  cient by themselves to motivate 
reform.
The Geographic Scope Of Exchanges
Under the CED proposal, or any market-based sys-
tem that uses the exchange model, a potentially criti-
cal choice is the geographic scope of the exchange or 
exchanges.  Many diff erent opinions have been heard; 
some have advocated one national exchange, and some 
have argued for an exchange in each individual state.  
CED’s own plan specifi ed regional exchanges, with 
boundaries following coherent health-care markets – 
perhaps embracing several states, or perhaps only parts 
of individual large states.
However, an important insight arising from the 
interviews in this project is that the ideal borders for an 
exchange might or might not be the same with respect to 
pricing as they would be with respect to administration 
or regulation.  In the case of California, one exchange 
might cover all of the state to capture economies of 
scale in administering the program, but the experience 
of CalPERS suggests that premium rating ought to be 
done by economic zones that refl ect the geographic 
diff erences in costs and prices in diff erent parts of the 
state.
CalPERS found that when they used uniform prices 
across the state, some local public agencies that be-
longed to CalPERS, and that operated in low-cost parts 
of the state, could get much lower premium rates out-
side the exchange than in it.  So those agencies started 
dropping out.  CalPERS then divided the state into fi ve 
economic zones for premium rating – from high-cost 
Northern California outside of the San Francisco Bay 
Area and Sacramento (where the Blue Shield Access + 
HMO premium is $1,524 per family per month), to Los 
Angeles (where it is $1,104, or 28 percent less), to forestall 
this adverse development.
But on the other hand, as the interview revealed, having 
CalPERS manage the exchange for the whole State 
creates some important economies of scale in such 
things as contracting, including benefi t design.  Th us, 
under an ideal exchange system, a single exchange 
carrying out administration and regulation might 
encompass several pricing zones.  In the context of the 
recent policy debate in Washington, which centered on 
state-based exchanges, it is clear that states will be the 
ideal boundaries for exchanges with respect to pricing 
only by pure accident – and state exchanges might very 
well forfeit potential administrative and regulatory 
economies of scale.
Economies Of Scale In Risk Pools, And Benefi ts 
For Innovation
A large exchange that can aff ord to off er multiple health 
plans is in a much better position to foster desirable 
innovation than are individual large employers, by 
reason of important but insuffi  ciently recognized 
economies of scale.
Individual employers generally would not be interested 
in off ering a plan that appealed to only fi ve or 10 percent 
of their population, because such a plan would entail 
high per-employee administrative costs.  Yet such a plan 
might embody a very desirable innovation that could put 
competitive pressure on other plans.
For CalPERS with its 1.3 million covered lives, fi ve to 10 
percent of its population is 65,000-130,000 lives, a num-
ber large enough to make it worthwhile for the exchange 
to off er it and for a plan to design and off er the model.  
If available nationwide or even statewide, a plan of that 
size could create true competitive pressure and drive the 
entire market toward increased effi  ciency.  However, if 
forced to win subscribers employer by employer, even a 
highly effi  cient and innovative plan of that nature would 
be unlikely ever to gain a foothold.
As described in the interview above, CalPERS fostered 
a signifi cant and desirable innovation along these lines.  
First, they asked Blue Shield to off er “Blue Shield Net 
Value,” a very selective network of the highest-value 
physician organizations.  In Los Angeles, this could be 
off ered for a 13 percent lower price than Blue Shield 
Access +.  Th is same kind of product has been developed 
by Health Net and Pacifi care, but they have not found 
much receptivity in the employer market, because many 
employers prefer to off er only one or very few plans, 
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including at most one fl avor of carrier HMO, for reasons 
of administrative cost.  Th erefore, the plan or plans they 
choose must appeal to a wide cross-section of employ-
ees.  (Recall that for the great majority of private employ-
ers, the preferred number of plan off erings is one.)  Yet 
in the CalPERS population, this plan could attract about 
110,000 lives in 2009, and thus be more than commer-
cially viable.  And that off ering can put competitive pres-
sure on medical groups that lose membership to groups 
included in Net Value.
CalPERS went on to encourage Blue Shield, in the con-
text of the Net Value product, to develop an innovative 
program in Sacramento in which Hill Physicians and 
Catholic Healthcare West teamed up to commit to hold-
ing 2009 per-member per-month cost constant into 2010, 
and to do it by improved integration and cooperation 
between the physician organization and the hospitals.  
(Again, see the above interview on CalPERS.)
Conclusion
Health care in California as a whole is unsustainable, 
just as it is for the entire nation.  However, experiments 
within California have shown a path that could lead 
toward an improved health-care system.
Th e slower growth of health-care cost state-wide, com-
pared with growth across the nation as a whole, shows 
the potential of the innovations in California.  Th e satis-
factory results in the individual innovating systems indi-
cate a possible cause of the above-average performance 
of the state.
However, the current unsatisfactory state of the 
California market, coupled with the unsustainable 
growth of cost in the national market, provides a fi nal 
lesson.  Even though some employer systems are 
performing well in California, we have not seen the 
result typical of competitive markets, where superior 
performers expand market share and force effi  ciency 
laggards to improve, driving up overall performance 
and benefi ting consumers.  In fact, even some of the 
California companies that we interviewed – successful, 
progressive fi rms on the cutting edge of their fi elds 
– do not employ the competitive model espoused by 
CED, and show no interest in adopting it.  Th ey are 
satisfi ed with their own current performance, see some 
compelling reasons to continue their approach, and are 
unwilling to accept the inevitable risks of change.  Th is is 
true even of companies whose representatives expressed 
a belief that the current employer-based system is not 
sustainable in the long term.  For all of these reasons, the 
practices of the effi  cient California performers have not 
spread nationwide, just as they have not spread within 
California.
Th ese are strong indications that the health-insurance 
and health-care markets are not competitive, and good 
performers do not have the leverage to drive out bad.  
Th is is so for several reasons.  As noted above, individual 
employers are driven by insurers and by their employees 
to off er only one plan, which leads to infl ation-laden 
fee-for-service medicine.  An effi  cient insurer that might 
be attractive to a sustainable share of the overall market, 
but would not appeal to all consumers, cannot induce an 
employer – which is compelled to off er only one plan – to 
strong-arm all of his employees to accept that one plan.  
Because the employer will not off er that niche-market 
effi  cient plan as an alternative, it cannot enter the market 
at all.  Th e experience of CalPERS in nurturing such 
a niche plan has demonstrated the potential for such 
disruptive innovations in the health-care marketplace.  
But the failure of that innovation to propagate on its 
own indicates strongly that it may take public-policy 
intervention to allow even such existing, successful 
models to improve the health-care marketplace in ways 
that in other industries are the natural achievement of 
the “invisible hand.”
CED will continue to pursue the improvements in pub-
lic policy that are needed to provide quality, aff ordable 
health care for all, with these lessons from California 
experience as an important guide.
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I. Introduction
Th e “California Delegated Model HMO” refers to a 
type of health plan/delivery system that is made up of 
partnerships among: one of seven insurance carriers; 
roughly 200 medical groups and other physician 
organizations; and contracting hospitals.  Th e physician 
organizations contract with the carriers to care for 
enrolled members on the basis of per-capita prepayment 
for professional services plus, in some cases, limited 
risk sharing for institutional services or pharmacy costs.  
Th e name “delegated model” refers to the fact that the 
insurance carriers delegate medical decisions to the 
physicians, rather than trying to do the job of utilization 
management with their own medical staff . 
Th e seven carriers participate in the Integrated Health-
care Association (IHA).  IHA is a statewide non-profi t 
leadership group that includes major health plans, 
physician groups, and hospital systems, plus academic, 
consumer, purchaser, pharmaceutical and technology 
representatives.  Th e IHA promotes integration and value 
improvement in California health care, and has created 
and operates the nation’s largest pay for performance 
(P4P) program in which physician organizations receive 
incentive payments for superior performance in a suite 
of quality metrics.  (Th e IHA contribution was to convene 
representatives of all the participants and obtain agree-
ment on a common set of metrics for purposes of report-
ing and bonus payments, as well as to establish agree-
ment on bonus methodologies, so that all medical groups 
would be working to the same reward system.)
Th e enrolled commercial (i.e. non-Medicare, non-Med-
icaid) membership covered by the California delegated 
model has been declining steadily from, for example, 
6,278,188 lives at the end of 2004 to 5,219,952 at the end 
of 2008.50
About two years ago, David Joyner, Senior Vice President 
for Network Management at Blue Shield of California, 
reported to the IHA board that a thorough analysis of 
their data, operating in both the HMO and PPO markets, 
50  As reported in the health plans’ fi nancial fi lings to the 
Department of Managed Health Care, available at http://
wpso.dmhc.ca.gov/fe/search/#top .
with adjustment for comparative risks, showed that by 
and large the California Delegated HMOs have lost their 
cost advantage.  In some markets, HMOs cost less, in 
others PPOs cost the same or less. (Kaiser Permanente 
maintains its cost advantage in most market segments.)
Th ese developments are a cause for concern among 
those who would like to see more vibrant competition 
among health plans in California.  Th is memorandum 
is a discussion of some of the issues contributing to this 
trend.
II. Incomplete Incentives Alignment in the 
California Delegated Model 
 1. On Capitation and Dues or Premium Rates
If a health plan seeks agreement on a lower capitation 
payment to a medical group, there is nothing in the 
reduction of the capitation rate that is of any benefi t to 
the medical group.  Th e loss to the group is gain for the 
plan.  It is a zero sum game. So plan-group incentives are 
actually opposed on this important point.  Th is can be 
contrasted with the situation in a fully integrated pro-
gram with mutual exclusivity as between the group and 
the plan (e.g., integrated delivery systems such as Kaiser 
Permanente).  In that case, the group and the plan have 
common interests.  Th e health plan knows that with-
out well paid, satisfi ed doctors in adequate numbers, it 
would not have a good business.  Its success depends 
on the success of the group.  And the group knows that if 
the plan’s premium is not competitive, if it cannot off er 
good value for money, it will lose members and patients.  
So their shared interests point them in the same direc-
tion - that is, a competitive premium and good value for 
money.
Two ideas for how to improve incentives alignment have 
been proposed and tried.  One is a tiered network in 
which the plan charges lower copayments for patients in 
groups accepting lower capitation rates.  Apparently, this 
has run into opposition from the high-cost groups and 
hospitals who do not want their costliness to be exposed 
to cost-conscious consumer choice.  Also, employers 
often must want to control the copayments, and possibly 
standardize them across plans (as is done at Stanford 
and CalPERS).  That is, the copayments are an 
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employee-relations issue.  It would be interesting to 
gather data on the extent of tiered networks among IHA 
health plans.
Another idea for how to improve incentives alignment 
is for plans to off er “value networks” made up of lower-
priced groups to employers at lower premiums.  For 
example, in CalPERS in the San Francisco Bay Area, 
the Blue Shield Net Value plan, a narrower network of 
higher-value groups, charges $478.22 per single member 
per month compared to $532.93 for Blue Shield Access 
Plus, which off ers most or all groups.  And in fact, Blue 
Shield Net Value is priced below Kaiser in Los Angeles.  
So this approach is meant to reward groups accepting 
lower prices with being a part of a more economical and 
hopefully more popular product.  Blue Shield Net Value 
has enrolled over 108,000 covered lives in 2009.
Th e popularity of this product is limited by the fact 
that some of the most famous groups are not included.  
Also, large employers may not want to off er it because 
they want to off er only a few products that satisfy many 
employees.  For example, Health Net and Pacifi care 
HMOs received recognition for their innovation in 
creating value networks, but apparently this was not a 
major success in the employer market.
A major advantage of large PERS-like exchanges is that 
they can off er “niche” network products, such as these 
value networks, that appeal to a relatively low percent-
age of people.  Such a large insurance “exchange” knows 
that the niche products do not need to attract or satisfy 
most people to achieve suffi  cient enrollment to survive.  
With that opportunity, innovative products can prove 
themselves and potentially move the entire market.  In 
contrast, such niche plans would not appeal to individual 
employers, who almost always want only plans that will 
appeal to large percentages of their workforces, and so 
those plans would not have the opportunity to drive in-
novation.
A similar point applies as between plans and hospitals.  
Th e delegated model involves zero sum, opposed 
interests. Also, unfortunately from the cost point of view, 
many hospitals are full or are in monopoly positions, so 
they do not have much reason to accept lower prices.
 2. On Resource Use Other Than Professional 
Services
Th ough there is variation, apparently most HMO/group 
contracts do not put the groups at risk for institutional 
services or for pharmacy.  (Some groups do bear some 
hospital risk.)  Th us, groups have no strong incentives to 
hold down resource use in these categories.  It may even 
be easier for them to prescribe more hospitalizations 
or drugs to reduce physician work load.  In some cases, 
incentives may be worse, such as in the case of doctors 
receiving payments from manufacturers of devices (such 
as joint replacement prostheses, stents and pacemakers)  
and making decisions on use of their products, shift-
ing costs to hospitals that pay for the devices or pass the 
costs through to insurers.  At the request of plans, IHA is 
building a list of measures of Appropriate Resource Use 
(ARU) to reward appropriate group resource use deci-
sions in, for example:
 • Use of Ambulatory Surgery Centers;
 • Use of generic prescribing;
 • Readmissions within 30 days;
 • Hospital Days per 1000 lives per year;
 • Hospital Admissions per 1000 lives per year; or
 • Emergency room visit rates.
Th ese indicators will be built into contracts between 
groups and plans with signifi cant gain sharing.  It would 
make sense for plans to pay on the basis of each group’s 
aggregate performance across plans to get a better statis-
tical base.  Th is could signifi cantly reduce misalignment 
of incentives.
 3. Measuring Total Resource Use
IHA is now working to develop measures of total resource 
use per capita (risk-adjusted) per medical group.  Th is 
could set the stage for gain sharing among the contract-
ing parties if resource use is more effi  cient.  An early 
stage of this kind of process is described in the section 
on CalPERS in the body of this report.  Blue Shield Net 
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Value has teamed up with Hill Physicians Medical Group 
and Catholic Healthcare West to off er a less costly joint 
product in the PERS Sacramento market.
 4. Misaligned Incentives for Investment
Because of lack of mutual exclusivity between health 
plans and medical groups,  the benefi ts of investments 
that a plan otherwise might make in a group (such as in 
information technology or consulting help to improve 
care processes) will be spread over six other health plans, 
and not captured by the investing plan.  Worse yet, the 
other six plans are competitors.  Th is clearly inhibits po-
tentially valuable investment in process improvement.
 5. Incentives for Unnecessary Hospitalization
Hospitals need and want to fi ll their beds and also have 
their high-cost equipment fully utilized.  So they have 
little or no incentive to cooperate in projects intended 
to reduce hospital use, including reducing use of the ER.  
Th e coming inclusion of readmissions costs within 30 
days into the costs of the hospitalization by Medicare will 
give hospitals some incentives to work with patients and 
their doctors to reduce the need for re-hospitalization.  
Could plans follow Medicare and get hospital agreement 
to include readmissions in the payment for the initial 
hospitalization?  Could IHA encourage that and make it a 
standard?
 6. Distorted Treatment Decisions for HMO 
versus PPO Patients
Groups are supplying services to both HMOs and PPOs.  
Presumably they practice medicine the same way for 
both groups of patients.  However, at least at fi rst look, it 
would appear that HMO patients would represent more 
work for groups because their care must be managed, 
while PPO patients would be less work and PPOs would 
pay per visit or service.  So it is not clear that medical 
groups have much incentive to sacrifi ce to make the 
HMOs do better if the customers are just as satisfi ed with 
fee for service.  Some might be just as happy to see the 
HMO business continue to decline.  Th e same analysis 
applies to hospitals and health plans, all of whom work in 
both HMO and PPO markets.
III. The Destructive Role Of Employers And 
Unions
To understand these dynamics, it is necessary to look 
upstream in the money fl ow to examine the role of em-
ployers.  If all employers off ered cost-conscious choices 
the way the States of California and Wisconsin, Stanford 
and the University of California, Wells Fargo and Hewlett 
Packard do for their employees, then it is reasonable 
to suppose that some 80 percent of employees would 
choose HMOs – provided that the HMOs could achieve 
and maintain a signifi cant cost advantage.  If the market 
is moving toward cost-conscious choice, it is reasonable 
to suppose that medical groups and hospitals would be 
motivated to serve that market.  Th e market share of cost-
conscious choice could increase as HMO facilities pro-
liferated, because some consumers now do not choose 
HMOs – whose facilities are not as numerous and hence 
might not be conveniently located.
But most employers do not off er cost-conscious choice.  
We lack a good survey of such employer behavior in Cali-
fornia, but the available national evidence indicates that 
a preponderance of employers drive health care almost 
solely toward the fee-for-service model.
Th e reason for this is clear from the CED policy state-
ment.  All but the largest employers are subject to heavy 
pressure to cover all of their employees through one 
insurer (because insurers want to avoid a risk of adverse 
selection, and the employers themselves save on admin-
istrative cost by dealing with only one insurer).  Smaller 
employers see themselves as too small to off er choices 
of plan, and so choose a “free choice” fee-for-service 
plan that includes most or all local doctors and hospitals.  
Such a plan will satisfy everyone, with respect to choices 
of providers.  But the cost of this non-choice of plan with 
wide choice of providers is high, both now and in the fu-
ture, because of static fee-for-service delivery and stifl ed 
innovation.
Large employers prefer to self insure for well known 
reasons, including avoidance of state benefi t mandates 
and premium taxes.  Self insurance means fee-for-service 
medicine in most cases, leading to the same stagnant 
practice patterns as for smaller employers.  Some large 
employers off er self-insured fee-for-service coverage 
46
and also choices of integrated delivery systems such as 
HMOs.  But in most instances, their employees are not 
off ered a cost-conscious choice, under which they would 
save money by choosing a more-effi  cient, less-costly 
plan.  Th us, few of their employees choose HMOs.  Some 
other large employers, like Stanford, buy insurance from 
HMOs and also off er self-funded PPOs, but with the 
proviso that employees are fully responsible for pre-
mium diff erences.  CalPERS does this also for California 
state employees.  In those comparatively rare instances, 
market forces do push competing modes of coverage and 
practice.  But with the market dominated by incentives 
driving fee-for-service medicine, progress toward more-
effi  cient, more-economical practice patterns has been 
slow to nil.
Unions play a role in this incentive-free industry pattern 
as well.  As noted in the CED statement, unions quite 
commonly bargain for no-out-of-pocket-cost health 
insurance for their members.  Because unionized 
employers tend to be large, some such employers 
can off er choices to their employees.  But because a 
condition of the contract is that the employer pays 
100 percent of the premium no matter which plan an 
employee may choose, employees have no incentive 
to consider cost.51  Changing contract terms to provide 
employees with meaningful cost-conscious choices 
can seem like a “give-back” to employees who see the 
high costs and insecurities endured by their non-union 
neighbors.  Th e clear message for unions and unionized 
employees is to pursue what appears to be in their own 
interest – apparently cost-free health coverage – but at 
the end of the day the result is higher-cost health care for 
the entire society, including themselves.
51 In fact, in many instances the incentive may be perverse.  
Some national-employer human resource professionals 
have told CED in interviews that employees who receive 
100 percent employer contributions regardless of the 
employee’s choice of plan, confused by the multiplicity of 
claims in competing health-insurance promotional ma-
terials, eventually choose the most expensive plan on the 
presumption that it must be the best.  Th ose of the same 
employers who have diff erent premium-contribution poli-
cies for management as opposed to unionized employees 
fi nd that the plan choices of the two groups are totally dif-
ferent.
IV. Conclusion
Th e newly enacted health-reform law will expand cover-
age to many currently underserved Americans – a worthy 
goal.  However, fee-for-service medicine will continue 
to dominate the market unless employers fi nd a way to 
off er competing plans through cost-conscious choices, 
which would be aided if unions could be convinced to 
accept responsible, fi xed-dollar premium contributions 
in exchange for higher cash compensation.  Today the 
trend does not appear to be in that direction; and without 
more-effi  cient delivery of health care, expanded cover-
age will prove an empty promise.  What could reverse the 
decline in California delegated model HMO membership 
would be a shift by employers to competition and cost-
conscious employee choice.  It is possible that the new 
excise tax on high-cost health plans could motivate such 
a shift.  If that proves insuffi  cient, then further changes in 
public policy will be necessary.
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With the support of the Blue Shield of California Founda-
tion, the Committee for Economic Development (CED) 
reports on our program to learn more about the feasibil-
ity and application of a market-based universal health 
insurance system from several large California-based 
employers, and to provide opportunities for current 
and emerging business leaders in California to discuss 
health-reform fi nancing options.  
To leverage our convening power to move business 
toward an understanding of the need for meaning-
ful, comprehensive reform of the health-care system, 
CED coordinated two forums in the Bay Area to engage 
key California stakeholders on the issue of health-care 
reform. Th ese targeted regional forums made the case 
for system-wide change directly to business leaders.  
Each meeting included a presentation of the national 
challenges in addressing comprehensive reforms by 
recognized experts from CED and other policy organi-
zations.  Th e forums stimulated discussions and media 
reports about which policy choices would lead to the best 
outcomes for health care, business competitiveness, and 
long-term economic growth. 
Below is a brief summary of the forums, the media gener-
ated, and the key concerns expressed by business lead-
ers: 
April 23, 2009
On April 23rd, CED and the Stanford Graduate School 
of Business Health Care Club hosted the Stanford GSB 
Health Care Summit: Is Health Care Getting Personal? at 
Stanford University.  More than 120 students attended 
the event, which featured two keynote speakers: Randy 
Scott, Founder of Genomic Health; and Mary Hall Gregg, 
Vice President, Global Clinical Trials and International 
Business at Quest Diagnostics, Inc. Both Scott and Hall 
Gregg touched on the future of health care, and off ered 
predictions for how new technology, in both genomics 
and diagnostic testing, heralds a new era of personalized 
medicine.
Th e event also included two roundtable discussion ses-
sions, where fi fteen health-care industry and business 
leaders discussed key health-care, economic, business 
and policy issues with small groups of students.  Among 
the roundtable discussion leaders was Charles Kolb, 
President of CED, who spoke about the importance of 
corporate statesmanship, and why it is never too soon for 
business students to become involved in public-policy 
reform.   
CED is proud to have continued its tradition of engag-
ing graduate business students in economic issues of 
national concern.  CED is committed to opening up the 
dialogue on health-care reform to include emerging 
business leaders, and is pleased to have had the opportu-
nity to provide a forum for students at Stanford to debate 
such a critical issue.
In addition to the generous support from the Blue Shield 
of California Foundation, CED was proud to have part-
nered with graduate students from the Stanford Health 
Care Club, McKinsey Corporation and Yahoo! to host this 
event. Th is event description and pictures can be found 
on www.ced.org at http://www.ced.org/news-events/
health-care/310-healthcare-summit-2009-is-healthcare-
getting-personal.
Appendix II
Report to the Blue Shield of California Foundation
Forum and Webinar Report For Business Champions For California Health Care Reform
Term: 1/1/2009 – 2/1/2010
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Small Group Dave Dickey, Co-Founder
Co-Founder, RedBrick Health
Topic:  “Earning the change we seek in health care 
through the alignment of health care fi nancing, personal-
ization and independence.”
Dr. Alain Enthoven
Marriner S. Eccles Professor of Public and Private Man-
agement, Emeritus and HP/PCOR Core Faculty Member, 
Stanford University
Topic:  “No Easy Solutions:  An Advocate’s Response to 
Critics of Managed Competition.”
Jim Greff et
Finance Director, Lilly Research Laboratories, Eli Lilly & 
Co
Topic:  “Eli Lilly Strategy on Personalized medicine - 5 
Words - Improved Outcomes for Individual Patients.”
Ron Gutman
Founder and CEO, Wellsphere
Topic:  “Health information 2.0: Online and mobile 
models for personalized information, engagement and 
support.”
Susannah Kirsch
Venture Capital Professional, Physic Ventures
Topic:  “Personalized health in a consumer-directed 
world.”
Charlie Kolb
President, Committee for Economic Development (CED)
Topic:  “Th e Importance of Corporate Statesmanship: 
Why American Business Voices Matter in the Fight for 
Health Care and Public Policy Reform”
David Levison 
CEO, CardioDx
David G. Lowe Ph.D.
Managing Director, Skyline Ventures
Topic:  “Hope versus reality in personalized medicine: 
obstacles and opportunities to commercial success.”
Paul Maloney
Principal, ZS Associates
Topic:  “Biopharma Self-imposed Disruptive Innovation:  
How Drug Companies Can Reinvent Th eir Approach to 
Marketing and Sales”
Samuel R. Nussbaum, M.D.
Executive Vice President, Clinical Health Policy and 
Chief Medical Offi  cer, WellPoint, Inc.
Topic:  “Health Plan Strategies to Improve Patient Health.  
How WellPoint uses comprehensive health information 
and data to identify gaps in care, promote evidence-
based medicine, and improve health outcomes.”  
Alain T. Rappaport, MD, Ph.D.
General Manager, Health Search, Health Solutions 
Group, Microsoft Corporation
Topic:  “Th e Internet and Personalized Health Care.”
Jeff  Tangney
President, Chief Operating Offi  cer and Co-Founder, 
ePocrates
Topic:  “HC IT on Steroids:  What will $30 bil in Recovery 
Act stimulus do to the market.”
David Woodhouse, Ph.D.
Vice President, Goldman, Sachs & Co. Investment Bank-
ing Division, Healthcare Group
Topic:  “After the Dust Settles: Impact of the Capital Mar-
kets and M&A trends on the Direction of the Healthcare 
Industry”
Grant Wood
Senior IT Strategist, Intermountain Healthcare Clinical 
Genetics Institute
Topic:  “Opportunities Created as We Store and Use 
Personalized Medicine Data in Electronic Health Record 
Systems.”
Chris Young
Vice President, Ascension Health
Topic:  “Corporate America:  Th e Need for full Engage-
ment in the Transformation of the Health Care Delivery 
system.
Small Group Leaders and their discussion topics included:
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November 10, 2009
On Tuesday, November 10th, 2009 CED, in partnership 
with the Bay Area Council, hosted a forum entitled Th e 
Business Case for National Health Care Reform in San 
Francisco.  Th e audience of 80 consisted primarily of 
business and civic leaders.
Th e forum featured keynote speaker Ken Shachmut, Ex-
ecutive Vice President of Safeway Health, who delivered 
a dynamic presentation on Safeway’s health care fi ndings 
and policies.  His presentation outlined the economic 
pressure of the current health care system on employers 
and employees alike.  Shachmut shared with the audi-
ence the cost-saving methods adopted by Safeway to 
incentivize healthy lifestyle choices by its employees.
Th e co-chairs of the CED health-care report, Robert 
Chess, Chairman, Nektar Th erapeutics, and Alain En-
thoven, Marriner S. Eccles Professor of Public and Private 
Management, Emeritus, Stanford University Graduate 
School of Business, presented CED’s case for health-care 
reform. In his remarks, Enthoven informed the audience 
of the issues in the current health-care reform debate 
on Capitol Hill, and discussed the policy areas on which 
business should focus.
Following the presentations, Lynn Jimenez, Anchor of 
KGO’s Morning News, moderated an expert panel.  Pan-
elists answered a series of questions from the moderator 
and audience members about the cost of diff erent types 
of health-care-reform models, the effi  cacy of cost savings 
through an expansion of integrated health-care systems, 
and why it is important for business to play a role in 
the health-care-reform debate. Th e panel consisted of 
Lloyd Dean, President & CEO, Catholic Healthcare West 
and Chairman of the Bay Area Council; Charles Kolb, 
President, CED; Lenny Mendonca, Chairman, McKinsey 
Global Institute; Wade Rose, VP Public Policy & Advo-
cacy, Catholic Healthcare West; and Jim Wunderman, 
President & CEO, Bay Area Council.
Th e timing of the event was ideal, as the Speaker of the 
U.S. House of Representatives, Nancy Pelosi, was in San 
Francisco to discuss health-care reform.  Th is resulted in 
media coverage of CED’s event on the radio and in the 
San Francisco Chronicle as an additional and somewhat 
diff ering view of that of Speaker Pelosi.  Th e media report 
is attached.  
CED Health Care Webinar – June 26, 2009
On June 26th, 2009 CED hosted a webinar on health care 
reform. Th e presentation and discussion was led by Joe 
Minarik, CED Senior Vice President and Director of Re-
search, and Alain Enthoven, Marriner S. Eccles Professor 
of Public & Private Management, Emeritus, at the Stan-
ford University Graduate School of Business. 
Th e webinar documented that America’s employer-
based health-insurance system is failing. Coverage under 
employer insurance is fl at in a growing eligible popula-
tion, while national health expenditures rise 2.7% per 
year faster than the rest of the GDP.  CED believes that 
we need to move beyond the current employer-based 
system and realign incentives in the health-care market. 
Meaningful reform can only be achieved by introducing 
greater choice for individuals and healthier competition 
among insurers.
CED’s approach to health-care reform includes the 
creation of exchanges with a menu of competing private 
insurance plans from which each individual may choose.  
It would create the greatest incentives to improve quality, 
cost, and service.  Under the CED plan, every American 
would have access to high-quality, aff ordable health care. 
Th e event description can be found on the CED web site 
at http://www.ced.org/news-events/health-care/364-
health-care-webinar.  
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Media Coverage related to the CED November 
10, 2009 Event:
Bottom Line: Chinese IT fi rm opening in S.F.
San Francisco Chronicle, Andrew Ross
November 10, 2009
http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/
c/a/2009/11/09/BUD51AGAB0.DTL
A fast-growing Chinese IT consulting and outsourcing 
company is set to open in San Francisco, refl ecting the 
country’s increasing competitiveness in a market space 
long dominated by India.
Isoftstone Inc. of Beijing is expected to pitch tent in San 
Francisco early next year and begin extending its U.S. cli-
ent base, which already includes Microsoft, IBM, Citi-
group and Boeing, to the rich pickings in the Bay Area. 
“We’ll grow as quickly as the market will bear,” said 
Anders Brown, the company’s senior VP. While the Bay 
Area staff  will be small initially, “We expect to double or 
triple the size of our San Francisco offi  ce over the next 
couple of quarters,” Brown said.
Isoftstone employs 7,000 people worldwide and is look-
ing to go public on the NYSE in the next year, I’m told.
Th e move represents another notch in the belt for Chi-
naSF, the city agency with an offi  ce in Shanghai that has 
worked to bring Isoftstone here since December. It joins 
several Chinese solar and biotech companies whose San 
Francisco presence has been assisted by ChinaSF in the 
past year. On the runway, I’m told, are two more Chinese 
solar companies, a bank and a digital media fi rm.
“China is our largest international trading partner,” said 
Ginny Fang, director of ChinaSF (links.sfgate.com/
ZIPW). “We must continue to work closely with fast-ris-
ing companies there.” 
Job seekers, look east: From across the Formosa Strait, 
a Taiwan “recruitment mission” is winging its way to Sili-
con Valley later this week, looking to fi ll more than 1,500 
IT slots in the island nation.
Recruiters from high-tech companies will be on hand 
at the Hyatt Regency Santa Clara Friday and Saturday, 
talking to those who might be interested from various 
fi elds, including semiconductors, telecommunications, 
biotech and clean energy. 
Taiwan’s government promises to smooth the way, with 
a one-stop “employment pass,” tax incentives and Tai-
wanese residency. Th e kind of bennies, btw, Asian and 
European countries are off ering U.S. companies to set up 
shop overseas aren’t being matched by the United States, 
critics say.
In addition to the job fair, a senior government minister, 
Chang Jin-fu, will hold an investment seminar Friday 
afternoon titled “Taiwan as an Asian Hub: Outlook & 
Opportunities.” More details on the job fair, and Taiwan’s 
high-tech recruitment program, at links.sfgate.com/
ZIPV.
Code blue: A number of prominent Bay Area executives 
and health care experts will present the “business case” 
for health care reform at a free, open-to-the-public con-
fab in San Francisco today.
It’s not the kind of case the Obama administration or the 
legislation’s water carriers might particularly care for.
Among the conference’s bullet points: 
-- Th e system requires “a change far more sweeping than 
any advancing in the Congress today.”
-- “Legislative eff orts to date point in the wrong direction, 
and the savings that are claimed to pay their costs are 
doubtful at best.”
-- Ditch the current fee-for-service system, which re-
mains the keystone of the legislation, and replace it with 
a “market-incentive-based system,” some of which is 
contained in an amendment off ered by Sen. Ron Wyden, 
D-Ore.
Th ese, at least, are the positions of the Washington, D.C., 
Committee for Economic Development, which is spon-
soring today’s conference at the Bank of America Center, 
555 California St., 12-2 p.m. 
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One panelist, Alain Enthoven of Stanford University’s 
Center for Health Policy, is a known backer of Wyden’s 
amendment. Safeway Inc., represented at the confer-
ence by the company’s executive VP, Ken Shachmut, 
ejected fee-for-service as part of its employee insur-
ance program, and Lenny Mendonca, chairman of San 
Francisco’s McKinsey Global Institute, has long favored 
diff erent payment and incentive models.
It will be interesting to hear from Lloyd Dean, CEO of 
Catholic Healthcare West and FOB (Friend of Barack), 
who has heretofore sworn fealty to the White House ap-
proach. 
In the end, though, as thought-provoking as the confer-
ence’s bullet points may be, isn’t it a little late to turn the 
ship around? 
“I don’t think so,” Mendonca says. “Th ere’s lots of heavy 
lifting still in the Senate.”
Conference proceedings should be posted on the CED 
Web site (www.ced.org) next week. 
Pelosi Answers Tough Questions at Home
Abclocal.com (KGO-TV San Francisco), Mark Matthews
November 10, 2009
http://abclocal.go.com/kgo/story?section=news/
politics&id=7111827
House Speaker Nancy Pelosi faced tough questions in the 
Bay Area over the battle for health care reform. She met 
with reporters in San Francisco’s federal building. 
On the heels of Saturday’s vote, Pelosi is back home 
pushing the legislation forward, even as questions arise 
about whether the entire package will pass and how 
much it will accomplish.
It was a very friendly crowd at the federal building and 
when asked about a provision in the bill that has split in 
her party over the provision to ban abortion coverage, 
Nancy Pelosi called it a temporary distraction. 
“Beware of any of these kinds of issues because the fact is 
they want to take your attention away,” said Pelosi. 
Pelosi said heated protests focusing on infl ammatory 
issues are keeping Americans from hearing what the 
legislation will do for them. 
However, on KGO Radio Tuesday morning, the president 
of the Committee for Economic Development -- an inde-
pendent, non-profi t, non-partisan, public policy organi-
zation -- told Ron Owens that the bills in the House and 
the Senate would bankrupt the country. 
“Th e system right now rewards volume it rewards people 
for doing more services more tests more medication,” 
says Charles Kolb, the president of Committee for Eco-
nomic Development. 
Th at said Kolb is a recipe for rising costs. 
“We want a system in this country that rewards value and 
actually focuses on the health of the patient,” said Kolb. 
Pelosi’s answer was “I completely agree. Th e fee for 
service is an obstacle to getting everything that we want.” 
But she added there are provisions in the bill that will 
move towards rewarding quality instead of quantity. 
“Well, community health centers are a big example of not 
having fee for service.” 
Pelosi pointed to Dr. Ricardo Alvarez, M.D., medical 
director of San Francisco’s Mission Neighborhood Health 
Center, who says his health center does focus on out-
comes. 
“I’d like to tell you that we do it purely because we have 
absolute clarity in the rationality of our interventions,” 
said Alvarez. 
Still, the truth is community health centers have fewer 
resources which has forced limits on what they can off er, 
but he says in other countries’ doctors order fewer tests, 
health care costs less, and yet the patients aren’t less 
healthy. 
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“You know we don’t need to do, we don’t need to be 
that aggressive the evidence isn’t that compelling,” said 
Alvarez. 
Pelosi says there are provisions in the bill that will bend 
the system towards quality of care rather than quantity 
and it is also not the end all for healthcare reform. 
“Don’t get the idea that in passing this bill, we’re taking 
a key and locking the capitol, and never passing another 
bill,” said Pelosi. 
At the free market advocacy group, the Pacifi c Research 
Center, the director of health care studies told ABC7 
Americans don’t want government deciding on what 
tests and what procedures will be available. 
Supporters of the bill say it will be doctors, not the gov-
ernment bureaucrats making those decisions and letting 
the insurance companies decide what we’ve got now. 
Pelosi Pushes Health Care Reform
KCBS.com
November 10, 2009
http://www.kcbs.com/pages/5645459.php?
House Speaker Nancy Pelosi was back in her home dis-
trict of San Francisco pushing for health care reform. 
She received a standing ovation Tuesday and chants of 
thank you as she called last weekend’s house passage of 
the health care reform bill historic.
But Pelosi said she knows it still has to get the nod from 
the Senate.
“I’m hopeful that we will have a bill as a Christmas pres-
ent for the American people. But we will have a bill and it 
will be soon.” Pelosi said.
Pelosi said she plans to see the senate leaders at the con-
ference table.
“Now, we will go up to the table fi ghting for a public op-
tion because we believe that’s the best way to keep the in-
surance companies honest and to increase competition,” 
said Pelosi.
But Charles Kolb, the President of the Committee for 
Economic Development said he has issues with the 
public option.
“Th e Committee for Economic Development is very 
much in favor of health care reform, but we’d like to see 
reform that actually bends the cost curve as well as pro-
vide universal coverage, but does so in a way that really 
off ers important structural reform that’s market-oriented 
and incentive-based,” Kolb said.
Representatives from the AARP, local health centers, 
labor and the small business majority were out to lend 
their support to the house version of the bill.
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Broadcast Coverage Links:
KCBS News 
KCBS-AM – San Francisco, CA
November 10, 2009 (9:00 - 10:00 PM  Duration: 1:24)
Audio link: http://www.vmsdigital.com/download/newsdigital/ingestedfi le/mp3/TSF114802_01.mp3
KCBS News
KCBS-AM – San Francisco, CA
November 10, 2009 (6:00 - 7:00 PM  Duration: 1:22)
Audio link: http://www.vmsdigital.com/download/newsdigital/ingestedfi le/mp3/TSF114802_04.mp3
Evening Drive Time
KCBS-AM – San Francisco, CA
November 10, 2009 (5:00 PM  Duration: 1:25)
Audio link: http://www.vmsdigital.com/download/newsdigital/ingestedfi le/mp3/TSF114802_06.mp3
ABC 7 News At 9 
KOFY-TV – San Francisco, CA
November 10, 2009 (9:00 - 10:00 PM  Duration: 2:54)
Video link unavailable 
ABC 7 News At 6:00
KGO-TV – San Francisco, CA
November 10, 2009 (6:00 - 7:00 PM  Duration: 3:05)
Video link unavailable 
KTVU Channel 2 News At 5
KTVU-TV – San Francisco, CA
November 10, 2009 (6:00 PM  Duration: 1:17)
Video link unavailable
Th e Ronn Owens Show
KGO-AM – San Francisco
November 10, 2009 (10:00 - 11:00 AM  Duration: 1:00:00)
Audio Link: http://www.vmsdigital.com/download/newsdigital/ingestedfi le/mp3/TSF114802_06.mp3
For more information please contact, Meredith Hanley, Director of Foundation Relations at
Meredith.hanley@ced.org or 202-296-5860 ext. 31.
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